Introduction

For the past several decades, exegetes have been engaged in a quiet battle over a locus classicus of dogmatic theology—yet, quite curiously, few theologians have plundered the battlefield for booty.¹ I am referring to 2 Tim 3:16, the passage which on any reckoning must be regarded as of central importance to the self-witness of scripture.² From time to time—though with increasing regularity in conservative Protestant circles—exegetical essays are showing up which address a variety of problems: What is the meaning of γραφή—mere “writing,”³ or “scripture”? And if scripture is meant, does it refer exclusively to the autographs or does it include the copies?⁴ Does πάσα mean “all” or “every”?⁵ What is the meaning of θεόπνευστος? ⁶And, finally, what is the relationship of θεόπνευστος to γραφή—i.e., is it attributive (thus, “all/every inspired scripture is also profitable. . .”) or predicate (“all/every scripture is inspired and profitable”)?

It is the conviction of many exegetes that this last question is the most critical theologically—as well as the most difficult to resolve exegetically. Without entering into the theological discussion per se, though hopefully contributing to it, it is my purpose merely to address the issue of the grammatical relation of θεόπνευστος to γραφή. Further, I wish to restrict my discussion to what I consider to be the primary syntactical evidence,⁷ for I believe that we can come down fairly decisively on one side of the fence by standing on this leg of evidence alone.⁸

The Alleged Grammatical Ambiguity of the Text

In arguing for the primacy of syntax in resolving the issue, I am cognizant of going out on a limb not often taken in recent studies. For example, House suggests that since attributive and predicate nuances of θεόπνευστος are both “grammatically permissible,” “the decision ultimately must be made by determining how this word relates to its context.”⁹

Goodrick goes further in deprecating the feasibility of an objectively verifiable solution. He writes:

I have chosen [the translation] “All Scripture is God-breathed,” but I have little to defend what I have done. . . .

. . . I am reluctantly being dragged to the conclusion that an exegete of quality is one who has, by much exposure to the text and to the language in which it is written, developed a strong and reliable intuition.

I place the verb where I do because “it scans that way.”¹⁰

The problem with this approach is that the text does not ‘scan’ that way for several scholars who are equally proficient in their reading and exegetical skills.¹¹ Ultimately, the intuitive approach which Goodrick is advocating is usually quite serviceable for one’s first impression of a passage, but when he faces a crux interpretum such as 2 Tim 3:16, there is a high antecedent probability that his theological presuppositions will override, or at least cloud, his exegetical intuition.¹²

Nevertheless, the fact that Goodrick makes little effort in the direction of a syntactical resolution is indicative of a majority trend: the grammar of 2 Tim 3:16 appears to be sufficiently unique, or perhaps sufficiently amorphous, to create something of a syntactical impasse.¹³

The Seminal Work of J. W. Roberts

In 1961, J. W. Roberts went against the tide and argued¹⁴ for an attributive θεόπνευστος by basing his argument squarely on the linguistic structure of the text:

There are twenty-one instances in the New Testament in which pas is used to modify a noun which is immediately followed by another adjective as in 2 Tim. 3:16. In every case the Greek order of words is (1) pas, (2) the noun, and (3) the adjective. Typical examples are “every good tree” (Matt. 7:17); “every idle word” (Matt. 12:36); “every spiritual blessing” (Eph. 1:3); “every good gift” (James 1:17). . . . In no case of this usage is the adjective separated from the noun so as to be taken as a predicate.¹⁵

Roberts is to be commended for attempting to wrestle seriously with the syntactical phenomena of the text. In particular, he has clearly shown the error of arguments such as Dornier's: “Si l’adjectif θεόπνευστος était une épithète, il devrait normalement être placé avant γραφή; placé après, il se présente comme un attribut...”¹⁶

However, there seems to be a fundamental logical error in Roberts’ presentation: by definition Roberts seems to deny the possibility of the second adjective being predicate. He first declares that the only constructions he is examining are those in which πᾶς “is used to modify a noun which is immediately followed by another adjective [italics added].” But he concludes this survey by adding, “In no case of this usage is the adjective separated from the noun so as to be taken as a predicate [italics added].”¹⁷ Further, he assumes that the position of the adjective in an anarthrous construction is a reliable indicator of its relation to the noun: “In no case of this usage is the adjective separated from the noun so as to be taken as a predicate [italics added].”¹⁸ In actual NT usage, however, the adjective following a πᾶς—noun construction may be separated from the noun by an intervening word or phrase without being a predicate adjective,¹⁹ and conversely, as we will demonstrate, it may immediately follow the noun, yet not be attributive.²⁰

A Proper Method:
The Construction Within an Equative Clause

In addition to being circular, Roberts' argument is also semantically insensitive: all his examples, save perhaps one,²¹ are from non-equative clauses—i.e., clauses in which the main point (grammatically speaking) is not an assertion about the subject. In such clauses, predicate adjectives are indeed few and far between.²²

But the construction in 2 Tim 3:16 belongs to an equative clause—i.e., a clause in which the central point (syntactically at least) is an assertion about the subject. Now a point of clarification is in order. I am not arguing in a circle: I am not saying that since θεόπνευστος is a predicate adjective, 2 Tim 3:16 is an equative clause. That would indeed be putting the cart before the horse! Rather, the construction πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος καὶ ὠφέλιμος constitutes an equative clause because it requires an implied verb which, in turn, asserts at least that all scripture is profitable. This is entirely apart from the issue of θεόπνευστος’s special relation to γραφή.

A more valid approach than Roberts’, it seems to me, is one which focuses on equative clauses. We need to ask whether the adjective in a πᾶς-noun-adjective construction in an equative clause is normally predicate or attributive. However, since πᾶς is used in such constructions in the NT only a few times, it is necessary to expand our approach in two directions, though still concentrating on equative clauses: (1) We will touch on the slightly broader phenomenon of adjective-noun-adjective to see if this will help to inform the more specific πᾶς -noun-adjective construction. But since there are only six such constructions in the NT, we also should get a representative sampling of usage in extra-NT Greek. (2) We will examine the πᾶς-noun-adjective constructions in equative clauses in the LXX. The LXX is targeted for its special contribution because (a) the LXX is both Koine Greek and biblical Greek,²³ and (b) the LXX can be examined exhaustively with reference to the πᾶς-noun-adjective constructions via Hatch and Redpath’s Concordance.²⁴

The contribution of extra-NT literature

Besides an exhaustive study of the general phenomenon of anarthrous noun-adjective constructions in the NT, I have looked at representative portions from Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Polybius, Josephus, select papyri, as well as the LXX.

In the 5,290 lines of text I perused, only three yielded instances of the adjective-noun-adjective construction in equative clauses.²⁵ Two of these, coincidentally, were in Herodotus. In Book 1.8 we see τίνα... λόγον οὐκ ὑγιέα. This, however, is not an ideal parallel for there is an intervening word between the first (pronominal and attributive) adjective and the noun and a negative particle separating the second (predicate) adjective from the noun. In 1.6, however, we see a clearer example: πάντες  ῞Ελληνες ἦσαν ἐλεύθεροι. Here the pronominal adjective is attributive while the second adjective is predicate. This affords an excellent parallel with 2 Tim 3:16, for those who affirm that θεόπνευστος is a predicate adjective are also convinced that the location of the implied equative verb or copula (at least, as far as the translation is concerned) is between γραφή and θεόπνευστος. Herodotus’ example offers proof that such an understanding can be legitimate in Greek.²⁶ The other reference is Zech 14:21 in which πᾶς is attributive and ἅγιον (ἅγιος in some witnesses) is predicate (ἔσται πᾶς λέβης...ἅγιον).

Although no other examples were found in equative clauses, I did find two more precise parallels to the total construction in 2 Tim 3:16 in the LXX. By ‘precise’ I mean adjective-noun-adjective-καί-adjective (which, in 2 Tim 3:16, is πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος καὶ ὠφέλιμος). In Deut 7:1 the construction is ἑπτὰ ἔθνη πολλὰ καὶ ἰσχυρότερα with ἑπτά functioning as an attributive and πολλὰ καὶ ἰσχυρότερα functioning as predicates. In Gen 2:9 the adjective preceding the noun is πᾶς (πᾶν ξύλον ὡραῖον εἰς ὅρασιν καὶ καλὸν εἰς βρῶσιν)—again, the adjectives following are predicate.²⁷

Therefore, in the only three parallels to 2 Tim 3:16 in equative clauses I discovered in extra-NT literature, the second adjective was always predicate and the first adjective was attributive. And in the only two constructions in extra-NT literature which paralleled the complete construction of adjective-noun-adjective-καί-adjective in 2 Tim 3:16, even though both parallels were in non-equative clauses, the adjectives following the noun were predicate while the adjective preceding the noun was attributive. Although the examples are not numerous, it might be significant that they all point in one direction.

The phenomenon in the New Testament

Adjective-noun-adjective constructions in equative clauses. I discovered only six instances in the NT, apart from those involving πᾶς, in which the construction in equative clauses was adjective-noun-adjective. In Matt 22:36 and Mark 12:28 (parallel passages) there may be ambiguity as to which adjective is predicate and which is attributive. However, in neither instance can both adjectives be construed as attributive. Various strands of grammatical, lexical, and historical evidence, in fact, suggest that in each case the preceding adjective is attributive and the following adjective is predicate.²⁸ In Jas 3:8 κακόν is a substantival adjective with ἀκατάστατον preceding it and serving in an attributive role. However, these two words form the main body of the clause, with μεστή serving in an appositional capacity (in a sense) to κακόν. Technically, κακόν is in the predicate with an implied subject, ἀκατάστατον is an attributive adjective modifying this substantival adjective, and μεστή, though functioning as a predicate adjective, is functioning thus in its own appositional phrase, not in the main clause. Rev 16:18 affords a similar example (τηλικοῦτος σεισμὸς οὕτω μέγας).

The gospel of Luke furnishes better examples. In 19:17 we see ἀγαθὲ δοῦλε... πιστός. The first adjective is attributive and the second adjective is predicate. However, the second adjective is in the following clause (though the noun is only implied in the verb). But in 4:24 we have οὐδεὶς προφήτης δεκτός ἐστιν. Here the first (pronominal) adjective is attributive and the second adjective is predicate.

Thus in constructions not involving πᾶς no example had both adjectives functioning as attributives. However, there was ambiguity in two texts as to which adjective was attributive and which was predicate; two others had the second adjective outside of the main clause; and only one was a clear instance of attributive-noun-predicate. The πᾶς constructions hopefully will give us a clearer picture.

Πᾶς-noun-adjective constructions in equative clauses. Besides 2 Tim 3:16, there are at least four more similar constructions in the NT. In Luke 2:23 the construction is πᾶν ἄρσεν...ἅγιον...κληθήσεται. Here the pronominal adjective is attributive and the following adjective is predicate. In Jas 1:19 the construction is ἔστω δὲ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ταχύς... βραδύς...βραδύς. Here the pronominal adjective is attributive and all three adjectives following the noun are predicates. This, then, is a step closer to the 2 Tim 3:16 construction, for it too involves more than one adjective following the noun. In Jas 4:16 we see πᾶσα καύχησις τοιαύτη πονηρά ἐστιν. This is the first clear instance in either the NT or extra-NT literature which we have examined in which both the preceding and trailing adjectives are attributive. Yet in this isolated example, the linguistic situation veers off from what we see in 2 Tim 3:16 in one very important point, viz., the presence of τοιαύτη as the trailing adjective. τοιούτος, as other pronominal adjectives, may stand outside of the article-noun group but still have an attributive relation to the noun (cf. αἱ δυνάμεις τοιαῦται in Mark 6:2). In fact, with this in mind, we could well argue that Jas 4:16 fits neatly with the “predicate θεόπνευστος” view, for the following adjective, πονηρά, is predicate. In 1 Tim 4:4 the structure is even closer to that of 2 Tim 3:16: πᾶν κτίσμα θεοῦ καλόν, καὶ οὐδέν... Here it is obvious that the first adjective is attributive and the second is predicate. There is the further parallel in that the second adjective is joined by καί to the word in the predicate, οὐδέν. It might be objected that οὐδέν here is used substantivally and therefore does not afford an exact parallel with 2 Tim 3:16. However, the parallel is not at all diminished for ὠφέλιμος in 2 Tim 3:16, as οὐδέν here, could grammatically stand in the predicate alone. This text, then, is the closest parallel to 2 Tim 3:16 in the NT. The fact that it, too, is in a pastoral epistle adds weight to the view that θεόπνευστος in 2 Tim 3:16 is a predicate adjective.

As with the extra-NT evidence, and the adjective-noun-adjective constructions within the NT, the πᾶς-noun-adjective construction suggests the same semantics: the first adjective is attributive and the second is predicate. We have found no clear exceptions to this principle.²⁹ But admittedly, the examples are few: altogether only fourteen adjective-noun-adjective constructions were found in the extra-NT and NT literature. Nevertheless, this monolithic trend can hardly be used in support of an attributive θεόπνευστος in 2 Tim 3:16.

Πᾶς-noun-adjective constructions in equative clauses in the LXX

The singular semantic path down which our construction has gone has led me to propose, as a working hypothesis, the following ‘rule’: In πᾶς-noun-adjective constructions in equative clauses the πᾶς, being by nature as definite as the article, implies the article, thus making the adjective(s) following the noun outside the implied article-noun group and, therefore, predicate.³⁰ This hypothesis can be put through a rigorous test which is inductively complete and self-contained.³¹

In perusing the more than 6,000 entries on πᾶς in Hatch-Redpath, I culled from them (what I believe to be) all the πᾶς-noun-adjective constructions in equative clauses. Altogether, I discovered thirty-six such constructions. Remarkably, in thirty-five instances the πᾶς was definitely attributive and the adjective(s) following the noun was/were definitely predicate. For example, πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ ἑπτά in Gen 46:25; πᾶσα θυσία ἱερέως ὁλόκραυτος ἔσται in Lev 6:23(16); πᾶς ἀνήρ ...δίκαιος in Prov 21:2; πᾶσα κεφαλὴ φαλακρά in Ezek 29:18.³²

On only one occasion was there ambiguity. In 2 Kings (4 Kingdoms) 19:35 (πᾶντες σώματα νεκρά) it was questionable as to which adjective was attributive and which was predicate.³³ But even here it was not possible to construe both adjectives as attributive. Thus this one possible exception to the ‘rule’ in no way supports an attributive θεόπνευστος in 2 Tim 3:16.

On six occasions I discovered the construction πᾶς-noun-adjective-καί-adjective, which is an even stronger parallel to the construction in our target passage: ἦσαν δὲ πᾶσαι ψυχαί... πέντε καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα in Exod 1:5; πᾶν ἀρσενικόν...ὀκτακισχίλιοι καὶ ἑξακόσιοι in Num 3:28; πᾶν ἀρσενικόν... ἑξακισχίλιοι καὶ πεντήκοντα in Num 3:34; πᾶν ἀρσενικόν δύο καὶ εἲκοσι χιλιάδες in Num 3:39; ἦν πᾶς Ισραηλ χίλιαι καὶ ἑκατὸν χιλιάδες in 1 Chron 21:5; πᾶς δὲ τόπος... ἄβατος καὶ πυριφλεγὴς γινέσθω in 3 Macc 3:29. On each of these occasions both adjectives following the noun were predicate. Hence, these verses add substantial weight as fairly precise parallels,³⁴ along with 1 Tim 4:4, to 2 Tim 3:16.

The totality of this septuagintal evidence was so overwhelmingly in support of the ‘rule’ suggested in this paper that I felt compelled to pursue one more validation process. If it is true that the article is implied in the πᾶς in πᾶς-noun constructions in equative clauses, and that any adjective following the πᾶς-noun construction would be considered in the predicate, then it ought also be true that any adjective preceding the πᾶς-noun construction would be in the predicate. After all, if the πᾶς in such constructions implies the article, then it should not matter, ex hypothesi, which side of the article-noun group the adjective falls: either way, it should still be predicate.

I tested this hypothesis by again examining the entries on πᾶς in Hatch-Redpath. I discovered ten adjective-πᾶς-noun constructions in equative clauses. In each instance the adjective preceding the πᾶς-noun group was clearly predicate.³⁵

To summarize the septuagintal evidence: thirty-five of thirty-six πᾶς-noun-adjective constructions in equative clauses definitely supported the ‘rule.’ One was questionable, though it in no way viewed both adjectives as attributive. All ten adjective-πᾶς-noun constructions supported the ‘rule.’ Altogether, in forty-six syntactical parallels to our passage, at least forty-five support a predicate θεόπνευστος and the one possible exception does not support an attributive θεόπνευστος.

Conclusion

In this paper I have sought to demonstrate that the structural phenomenon of 2 Tim 3:16 does not create a grammatical impasse. That is to say, we do not need to rely solely on intuition nor quickly move on to contextual factors to understand the relation of θεόπνευστος to γραφή. There is a wealth of information provided by syntactical parallels which bring into sharp relief what appears to be the truly idiomatic nature of the construction.

A pioneer in giving priority to the syntax in 2 Tim 3:16 was J. W. Roberts. Yet, as significant as his study was, it involved certain weaknesses in method which resulted in a rather distorted view of the nuance of θεόπνευστος.

By restricting our study to equative clauses—of which there was a fairly ample supply—we believe that we have taken a more valid approach. The results, therefore, are more sure-footed. And, it bears repeating, the semantic force of our construction was so one-sided that we could suggest a principle based on it: In πᾶς-noun-adjective constructions in equative clauses, the πᾶς, being by nature as definite as the article, implies the article, thus making the adjective(s) following the noun outside the implied article-noun group and, therefore, predicate.³⁶

As applied to 2 Tim 3:16, this principle indicates that a predicate θεόπνευστος is certainly a valid—and perhaps the only—option. Hence, we translate the passage, “All/every scripture is inspired and profitable. . .”³⁷ In the least, our study suggests that the REB’s rendering “Every inspired scripture has its use” should probably be relegated (in our present state of knowledge) to the margin.

¹ I do not here mean to make a sharp dichotomy between exegete and theologian, for it is difficult (and, in my view, undesirable) to refrain from trespassing into the other’s realm from time to time (see S. L. Johnson, “Romans 5:12—An Exercise in Exegesis and Theology,” in New Dimensions in New Testament Study, edd. R. N. Longenecker and M. C. Tenney [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1974] 298-316, for a good that exegetes—if they are properly to understand the text—must also be sympathetic with the theological concerns of the primitive church).

² Of course, as such this is typically a concern—almost exclusively—of theological conservatives, especially in American evangelical circles, as may be seen by the bulk of the references in n. 11 (and passim). There are at least two reasons why work on this passage is usually the domain of evangelicals: (1) concern over the self-witness of scripture usually implies a high view of scripture—i.e., that it is something more than a mere human product; (2) those scholars who affirm the pastorals’ authenticity are finding themselves in an ever-shrinking circle. In spite of one’s estimation of scripture in general or the authorship of the pastorals in particular, all should recognize that these epistles constitute a significant part of the religio-literary records of the primitive church. And the fact that they eventually merited membership in the canon indicates something of their strategic role in either shaping or affirming the beliefs of nascent Christianity. Purely for the sake of a properly informed historical exegesis, therefore, New Testament scholarship as a whole should not neglect such a text.

³ C. K. Barrett, The Pastoral Epistles in the New English Bible (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963) 114.

⁴ G. L. Bahnsen, “Autographs, Amanuenses and Restricted Inspiration,” EvanQ 47 (1975) 162-67; E. W. Goodrick, “Let’s Put 2 Timothy 3:16 Back in the Bible,” JETS 25 (1982) 481-83.

⁵ This is one stone rarely left unturned by exegetes.

⁶ See M. R. Austin, “How Biblical is ‘The Inspiration of Scripture’?”, ExpTi 93 (1981-82) 76-79; H. W. House, “Biblical Inspiration in 2 Timothy 3:16,” BSac 137 (1980) 57-58; Goodrick, 484-85, for some recent studies. For a now classic treatment of this text, see B. B. Warfield, Revelation and Inspiration (Oxford: University Press, 1927) 229-59. Curiously, BAGD cites Warfield under θεόπνευστος, while the first edition of BAG lacks this citation.

⁷ Secondary syntactical evidence would include the force of the asyndetic clause, the implied placement of the missing copula, and the normal, even routine, use of καί when joining two adjectives. Besides these grammatical clues as to the author’s meaning, however, there are contextual indicators which, though less decisive here (for they usually degenerate into a presuppositional and, therefore, circular form of argument), are frequently trumpeted as the coup de grâce in the light of the alleged ambiguity of the syntax of the clause.

⁸ I do not regard grammar as a panacea for all of our exegetical ills, of course, but in this particular text I do think that the syntax of the construction has been too quickly passed over.

⁹ House, 58.

¹⁰ Goodrick, 483. To be sure, I have little doubt that Goodrick would appreciate some hard data which would corroborate how he reads the text (so, perhaps, ‘deprecate’ is too strong a term).

¹¹ So Barrett, Schweitzer, Leaney, Dibelius, Spicq, et al. Here is a good place, it seems, to catalog some of the specialized studies done in the last few decades over this issue.

On the side of an attributive θεόπνευστος: J. W. Roberts, “Every Scripture Inspired of God,” RestQ 5 (1961) 33-37; J. W. Roberts, “Note on the Adjective after Πᾶς in 2 Timothy 3:16,” ExpTi 76 (1964-65) 359; R. J. A. Sherriffs, “A Note on a Verse in the New English Bible,” EvanQ 34 (1962) 91-95; E. L. Miller, “Plenary Inspiration and II Timothy 3:16,” LuthQ 17 (1965) 56-62.

For a predicate θεόπνευστος: J. H. Bennetch, “2 Timothy 3:16a: A Greek Study,” BSac 106 (1949) 187-95; D. C. Oakley, “The Contribution of the Greek Text to the Doctrine of Inspiration” (Th.M. thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1955) 22-26; J. A. Witmer, “The Biblical Evidence for the Verbal-Plenary Inspiration of the Bible,” BSac 121 (1964) 243-52; J. P. Eidsness, “An Exegesis of Important Passages Relative to the Doctrine of Inerrancy,” (Th.M. thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1968) 54-55; T. P. McGonigal, “‘Every Scripture is Inspired’: An Exegesis of 2 Timothy 3:16-17,” Studia Biblica et Theologica 8 (1978) 53-64; House, 54-63; Goodrick, 479-87.

¹² On this score, the analogy that Goodrick draws concerning Günther Zuntz’s intuitive interpretation (483) breaks down, for Epictetus (where Zuntz, in Goodrick’s analogy, applied his intuition) is a far cry from the NT which respect to the presuppositional (and emotional) baggage that one brings to the text.

¹³ In particular, both Sherriffs and House staunchly affirm the structural ambiguity of the passage, though they both come down (quite tentatively) on opposite sides of the fence.

¹⁴ Though based, in part, on an earlier study by R. M. Spence (ExpTi 8 [1896-97] 563-65).

¹⁵ Roberts, “Every Scripture,” 35 (all references to Roberts will be to this article as his later essay in ExpTi was merely a summary of this one). “The other examples are Acts 23:1; 2 Cor. 9:8; Eph. 4:29; Col. 1:10; 2 Thess. 2:17; 2 Tim. 2:21; 4:18; Titus 1:16; 2:10; 3:1; Heb. 4:12; James 3:16; Rev. 8:7; 18:2; [sic] 12: [sic] 21:19” (ibid.).

¹⁶ P. Dornier, Les Épitres Pastorales (Paris: LeCoffre, 1969) 234. Cf. also J. N. D. Kelly, A Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles (London: A & C Black, 1963) 203, et al.

¹⁷ Ibid. There are four other, though somewhat less significant, problems with Roberts’ argument. First, his calculations are incorrect for there are more than twenty-one instances of the πᾶς-noun-adjective construction in the NT. We should add to the list these seven: πᾶν αἷμα δίκαιον in Matt 23:35; πάντα ἄνθρωπον τέλειον in Col 1:28; πάντος εἴδους πονηροῦ in 1 Thess 5:22; παντὶ ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ in 1 Tim 5:10; πᾶν ἔργον πονηρά in Jas 4:16. Second, Roberts does not consistently follow his own rule for not all of his examples fit the structural definition of an adjective immediately following the same noun which πᾶς precedes (cf. ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ ἀγαθῷ in 2 Thess 2:17 and πᾶσαν πίστιν ἐνδεικνυμένους ἀγαθήν in Titus 2:10). Third, the fact that Roberts has two examples which do not fit precisely the structural pattern he claims to be examining opens the door for two other examples, both of which alter the picture he has painted (cf. πᾶν ἄρσεν διανοῖγον μήτραν ἅγιον in Luke 2:23 and πᾶν κτίσμα θεοῦ καλόν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπόβλητον in 1 Tim 4:4). Finally, rather than intentionally distorting the data, I think that Roberts has contrived something of a mixed-bag method: although he is at first dealing with the relation of θεόπνευστος to γραφή, it is apparent that his discussion subtly picks up, perhaps unconsciously, a secondary issue, viz., the translation of πᾶς (34-35: he introduces the paragraph we have quoted by arguing for the lexical force of πᾶς [in this context, at least] as meaning ‘every’ rather than ‘all’; then, at the beginning of our paragraph he combines this with the syntactical force of θεόπνευστος, a point which occupies the major thrust of the paragraph. But toward the end of the paragraph he curiously switches back to the meaning of πᾶς, arguing that “the one place where the translations have ‘all’ is Titus 2:10 where the context shows that the word pas means ‘perfect’ or ‘complete’ faith” [35]).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Cf. 2 Thess 2:17 and, perhaps (though I would argue differently) Titus 2:10. (Cf. also examples cited in n. 34.)

²⁰ Cf. πάντα ἄνθρωπον τέλειον in Col 1:28, an object-complement construction (see my article, “The Semantics and Exegetical Significance of the Object-Complement Construction in the New Testament,” GTJ 6 [1985] 99-100 [n. 40] for a discussion of this text), πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ταχύς in Jas 1:19. There are other instances outside the NT which we will address shortly.

²¹ πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον ... ἐστιν καταβαῖνον in Jas 1:17, according to Roberts, forms an equative clause; yet it is possible that ἐστιν καταβαῖνον is periphrastic, rendering the whole clause as non-equative. On this, see discussion in n. 29.

²² Of the 2,054 anarthrous noun-adjective constructions in non-equative clauses I discovered in the NT, at most only seven percent involved predicate adjectives (typically, in object-complement constructions). See my essay, “The Relation of Adjective to Noun in Anarthrous Constructions in the New Testament,” NovT 26 (1984) 156, 159.

²³ By ‘biblical Greek’ I do not intend to convey agreement with Turner’s conclusion “that Bibl. Greek is a unique language with a unity and character of its own” (J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek, 4 vols, vol 3: Syntax, by N. Turner, 4).

²⁴ For purposes of this study, and the one on which it is based (Wallace, “The Relation of Adjective to Noun,” 132), the standard manual editions of Nestle-Aland25 and Rahlfs (for LXX) were used, though the results were checked against more critical works. It should be noted that the database was compiled before Nestle-Aland26-27, Gramcord/Accordance, or the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae were available. Thus, all the work had to be done manually.

²⁵ The portions examined were: Homer Odyssey 1.1-62, Iliad 18.1-165; Herodotus Book 1.1-22, Book 2.1-6 (Stein’s edition); Thucydides Book 1.1-14.3, Book 2.1.1-2.5 (Hude’s edition); Demosthenes Book 1.1-28 (First Olynthiac), Book 9.1-46 (Third Philippic); Polybius The Histories 1.1.1-11.8; Josephus Jewish Antiquities 15.1-99; Elephantine Papyrus 1,11.1-18; Elephantine Papyrus 2,11.1-18; Cairo Zenon Papyrus 59426.1-8; Cairo Zenon Papyrus 59251.2-22; Elephantine Papyrus 13.1-15; Urkunde der Ptolemäerzeit 59.1-33; Urkunde der Ptolemäerzeit 62.1-36; Tebtunis Papyrus 110.1-15; Berlin Griechische Urkunde 1103.2-30; and Berlin Griechische Urkunde 1121.1-46. In the LXX, I examined (apart from the specialized study on πᾶς-noun-adjectives which was culled, initially at least, from Hatch-Redpath) Gen 1:1-4:26; Exod 20:1-26; Lev 19:1-37; Deut 6:1-8:15; Psalms 1, 2, 17 (18), 21 (22), 31 (32), 38 (39), 50 (51), 70 (71) 118 (199), 149, 150; Isa 40:1-44:28; 49:1-53:12; Jonah 1:1-4:11; Zech 12:11-14:21.

²⁶ The placement of the verb and the sense of the construction, however, do not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence. Note the example in Zech 14:21 as well as those listed in n. 34.

²⁷ These two texts are listed here for the sake of completeness, though their relevance to our target passage, because they involve non-equative clauses, may be minimal.

²⁸ For a discussion, see my thesis, “The Relation of Adjective to Noun in Anarthrous Constructions in the New Testament” (Th.M. thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1979) 49-51.

²⁹ There is one twofold example which seems, prima facie, to violate this principle. In Jas 1:17 πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον are clearly fully attributive constructions. However, what is not so clear is whether the clause is equative or non-equative. In the words following (ἄνωθέν ἐστιν καταβαῖνον) it is possible to treat the verb and the participle in separate clauses or as a periphrastic construction. If they are periphrastic (in which case ἄνωθεν would qualify πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον rather than function predicatively to ἐστιν) then the whole clause would belong to the non-equative category. In light of the evidence amassed thus far, and in light of this distinct grammatical possibility, we cannot cite Jas 1:17 as a clear exception to the principle we have suggested.

³⁰ One objection to this principle at the outset might be concerned with its confinement to constructions involving πᾶς. Πᾶς, unlike most adjectives, does not need the article to make the noun any more definite. Thus it might also be added here that other pronominal adjectives which are equally definite would, in all probability, fit the ‘rule’ as well. We see this with the numeral εἷς in Eph 4:6, for example, in which the wording approximates a “Granville Sharp construction” (for which see my essay, “The Semantic Range of the Article-Noun-Καί-Noun Plural Construction in the New Testament,” GTJ [1983] 61-63): εἷς θεὸς καὶ πατήρ. Here it is obvious that πατήρ refers to the same person as θεός (note also τοῦτο in Acts 5:31). But are there examples of pronominal adjectives in adjective-noun-adjective constructions? Significantly, of the six instances of adjective-noun-adjective constructions in equative clauses we examined, the clearest parallel to the structural phenomenon in 2 Tim 3:16 was in Luke 4:24 (οὐδεὶς προφήτης δεκτός ἐστιν). Here the pronominal adjective does indeed function attributively while the second adjective is predicate.

³¹ By this I mean only that an entire body of literature (the LXX) can be examined exhaustively, rather than selectively, through the use of a concordance (Hatch-Redpath).

³² Cf. also Gen 46:22, 26, 27; Exod 1:5; Lev 11:32, 34 (bis); 13:58; 15:4 (bis), 9, 17, 24, 26; 17:15; 27:11, 28; Num 3:28, 34, 39; Josh 21:26; Judg 20:17; 1 Sam 11:8; 1 Chron 2:4; 21:5; Prov 3:15; 8:1; Jer 9:26; Zech 14:21; Sirach 23:17; 3 Macc 3:29.

³³ Of course, if πάντες is not modifying the noun (which is quote probable, due to the lack of gender concord) then we would most naturally treat it substantivally as a pronoun.

³⁴ It might be objected that these examples do not provide precise parallels because (1) in the first five instances, the καί joined two numerals in such a way that it would be impossible to treat these adjectives as bearing a different relation to the noun (e.g., if we were to consider πέντε in Exod 1:5 as attributive and ἑβδομήκοντα as predicate, we would get the nonsense reading of “all five people were also seventy”!); (2) in the last text cited (3 Macc 3:29), even though this passage does not involve the “numbers idiom,” the verb is expressed (γινέσθω), rendering it more explicit than the construction in 2 Tim 3:16.

In response, one should note that: (1) The very fact that the trailing adjectives in five of the examples can only be taken as predicates is hardly an argument against a predicate θεόπνευστος in 2 Tim 3:16. These instances may, in fact, be merely an extension—to the point of a set idiom—of the semantics of the πᾶς-noun-adjective construction we have already seen in the LXX. Further, all grammatical study must proceed on the basis of an indisputable semantic nuance for the particular construction under consideration. That all of the indisputable examples of the construction which is the concern of this paper affirm only that the adjective(s) following πᾶς-noun in an equative clause is/are predicate just might indicate that such was part of the warp and woof of hellenistic Greek. (2) Although the verb is expressed in 3 Macc 3:29, its location gives no hint as to whether the trailing adjectives should be treated as attributives or predicates. Hence, it affords a decent parallel to our target passage, for if the author of 2 Timothy had added a verb after ὠφέλιμος in 3:16 (paralleling exactly the construction in 3 Macc 3:29), the debate over the relation of θεόπνευστος to γραφή would hardly thereby have been settled. Further even when the verb does stand between noun and adjective, this is not a sure indicator that the adjective belongs in the predicate (cf., e.g., φῶς εἶδεν μέγα in Matt 4:16; τυφλοί εἰσιν ὁδηγοί in Matt 15:14; μικρὰν ἔχεις δύναμιν in Rev 3:8). Again, we submit that neither the presence (or absence) of the verb, nor its location in the clause, is the primary factor which determines the relation of adjective to noun in any given instance. (3) Admittedly, most of our parallels from the LXX employ the copula while it is absent from 2 Tim 3:16. But to demand that the parallels be more precise than πᾶς-noun-adjective in an equative clause (especially since the presence and location of the verb are not decisive matters) just might define any parallels out of existence. I am reminded here of W. Grudem’s recent insight in connection with the syntax of 1 Pet 3:19 (“Christ Preaching through Noah: 1 Peter 3:19-20 in the Light of Dominant Themes in Jewish Literature,” TrinJ [1986] 22):

... it is exegetically illegitimate to demand parallel examples which are so narrowly specified that one would not expect to find many, if any, examples. (It would be similar to saying that ὦν, “of whom,” in [1 Peter] 3:3 cannot refer to “wives” because there is no other example of a relative pronoun taking as its antecedent an articular feminine plural vocative...!)

Consequently, though the parallels we have uncovered do not qualify for the accolade “exact parallels,” they are as precise as the extant literature we have examined has turned up. In the least, it would appear that the burden of proof rests on the shoulders of the one who wishes to see attributive adjectives in such constructions.

³⁵ Deut 27:26; Prov 3:32; 11:20; 16:5; 22:11; Judith 16:16 (bis); Wisdom of Solomon 13:1; Sirach 25:19; 4 Macc 9:29.

³⁶ One should not be under the delusion that this ‘rule’ is absolute. As we have already pointed out, there may be exceptions to it within even the NT itself (Jas 1:17; 4:16). And I am sure that exceptions from extra-biblical Greek may well be produced. (Indeed, since the writing of the first draft of this paper, I have found one clear exception to this principle. In Didache 13.1 we read that “Every true prophet... is worthy of his food” [Πᾶς δὲ προφήτης ἀληθινός... ἄξιος ἐστι τῆς τροφῆς αὐτοῦ]. Here, ἀληθινός is attributive even though the clause is equative.) After all, a database of about fifty examples is simply too small a foundation from which to build a dogmatic superstructure. Still, it is striking to me that even these already-encountered potential exceptions have grammatical peculiarities which render them debatable. The preponderance of evidence within the pages of the Greek Bible is so staunchly on the side of a predicate θεόπνευστος that, in my opinion, advocates of an attributive θεόπνευστος must either counter with strong grammatical evidence of their own or else make out a better case on non-syntactical fronts. In other words, from all available evidence, the first readers of 2 Timothy would be expected to read θεόπνευστος as a predicate adjective since there is nothing compelling in the context to detour them from this most natural understanding.

We might add here a further clarification of the ‘rule’: By saying that πᾶς implies the article, we do not mean that the construction is semantically identical, on all levels, to πᾶσα ἡ γραφή. For if that were the case we would have to read the text as ‘all scripture,’ rather than ‘every scripture,’ yet the evidence from the LXX mitigates the necessity of the former translation (cf. 1 Chron 21:5; 3 Macc 3:29). The ‘rule,’ then, extends only to defining the relation of the trailing adjective to the noun.

³⁷ The NET Bible NT very accurately has “every scripture is inspired by God and useful for teaching...”

Review of
Carsten Peter Thiede,
The Earliest Gospel Manuscript?
The Qumran Fragment 7Q5 and its Significance for New Testament Studies¹
(London: Paternoster, 1992)
74 pp. + 6 pp. bibliography

Introduction

In 1962 M. Baillet, J. T. Milik, and R. de Vaux published the text and plates of manuscripts from six Qumran caves (caves 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10).² The seventh cave, in particular, had some interesting materials in that this was the only cave with exclusively Greek fragments. For most of these manuscripts, including 7Q5, the editors did not have a clue as to their textual identity. (7Q5 is a papyrus scrap with writing only on the recto side, having just five lines of text with parts of no more than twenty letters visible.³ The only complete word that can be detected is καιv—hardly a confidence-builder when it comes to a positive identification.)

Ten years later, in 1972, the Spanish papyrologist José O’Callaghan published a controversial article, “¿Papiros neotestamentarios en la cueva 7 de Qumrân?”⁴ in which he argued that the fifth manuscript from the seventh cave of Qumran was a fragment from the Gospel of Mark (6:52-53). This produced a spate of scholarly reviews⁵ and interactions—most of which rejected O’Callaghan’s identification. This rejection rested on three grounds: (1) principally, the papyrus itself was so fragmentary that any identification would be tenuous at best (not to mention the fact that there were several textually intrinsic problems with O’Callaghan’s proposal); (2) since the Qumran community almost certainly disbanded in 68 CE—and hence the MS must be dated before that time (in fact, most likely, no later than 50 CE)—the majority of NT scholars felt that even the original draft of Mark’s Gospel was not this early, obviously precluding the possibility that a copy of Mark could have existed before the fall of Jerusalem; and (3) the differences between the Qumran community (usually considered to be identical with the Essenes) and the nascent Christian community are so pronounced that contact between the two seemed improbable (and a literary contact, as O’Callaghan proposed, seemed to imply that not only was there communication between the two groups, but open and somewhat friendly communication).

O’Callaghan defended his views against virtually every assailant. But until 1982 he found few, if any, real followers. In that year Carsten Peter Thiede, a German scholar, began to publish in defense of the O’Callaghan hypothesis. In the last dozen years, in fact, he has surpassed his mentor in periodical proliferation. The book under review is, in many respects, the culmination of his efforts. The Earliest Gospel Manuscript?, Thiede’s first book in English on the subject, has been written to appeal to a wider audience (since his earlier writings have almost completely fallen on deaf German ears). There is today both interest in and sympathy toward the O’Callaghan hypothesis—especially now that it has a fresh advocate in Thiede.⁶ Indeed, at the ETS national meeting in November 1992, even Alan Johnson pleaded the case for Thiede’s volume.⁷

Why all the furor? What is at stake? A number of things: (1) If this identification is correct, it would be the earliest NT MS by some 50-100 years;⁸ (2) on paleographical grounds, since the upper limit of its date is 50 CE, this would put Mark in the 40’s at the latest; (3) one consequence of such an early date for Mark would be to virtually silence advocates of Matthean priority; and (4) finally, it would suggest, perhaps, that at least some of the New Testament documents were regarded highly enough to be copied soon after publication—a view which lends itself to an early recognition of the NT as canon.⁹

Body of Review

There are five chapters to this slender volume. The first, “Introduction,” is both a selective tracing of the history of the discussion and a rebuke of the scholarly community for not really listening to the arguments put forth by O’Callaghan. Chapter 2 (“Ì52—The Most Famous Papyrus”) is, in essence, an implicit yet not-so-subtle attempt to argue from similarities: since Ì52 is accepted by the entire community of NT scholars as a fragment of John’s Gospel from the first half of the second century¹⁰—even though it has itacisms and variants from the standard text—we should also accept 7Q5 as a fragment of Mark, and dated no later than 68 CE, since it has similar textual “glitches.” One telling argument that the two are not that similar is the fact that, as Thiede concedes, the identification and dating of Ì52 were “accepted without argument” (p. 12) by the scholarly community, while 7Q5’s identification has not been. Thiede spends an exorbitant amount of space demonstrating that 7Q5 should be dated no later than c. 50 CE. An interesting concession by the author, however, is the fact that C. H. Roberts, on whose expertise he relies, gives a variance of 100 years for the date of this MS: from 50 BCE to 50 CE. Obviously, the earlier the date, the less likely is the possibility that this fragment comes from the NT at all.¹¹ Even the most conservative NT scholars do not date the Gospel of Mark as early as this upper limit set by Roberts.

Chapter 3 (“7Q5—The Earliest New Testament Fragment?”) is the most substantial of the booklet, covering nineteen pages (23-41). Thiede puts forth a meticulously argued and somewhat technical case for the identification of this fragment with Mark 6:52-53. He points out, among other things, that even though at most ten of the twenty letters can be positively identified, (1) the three-letter space before καιindicates the beginning of a new paragraph (a not uncommon feature in ancient MSS), corresponding to the content break at Mark 6:53, and (2) line 4 apparently has the unusual combination of letters, ννησ (although the first and last letters are quite difficult to make out), corresponding to γεννησαρετin Mark 6:53.¹²

Thiede also responds at length to the three most common (and most serious) objections to this identification: (1) 7Q5 has a tau where Mark 6:53 has a delta (τι[απεράσαντες] vs. διαπεράσαντες); (2) in order to make the lines be of somewhat equal length and correspond to Mark’s text, the ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν of v. 53 must be omitted—even though no extant MSS omit this expression; and (3) a number of O’Callaghan’s identifications of the partially readable letters are quite improbable. To those involved in the debate over 7Q5’s identification, Thiede’s argument is more summary than new insight. In essence, he argues that (1) there are frequent interchanges between tau and delta in koine Greek,¹³ rendering such a possibility here hardly surprising; (2) other early papyri (e.g., Ì52, Ì45) omit material at times, even though such an omission is a singular reading; and (3) if O’Callaghan’s critics had taken the time to look at the fragment instead of a photograph, their objections about his letter reconstructions would have vanished.

These counter-charges by Thiede are not as substantial as he supposes. We shall approach them chiastically. First, both the original editors of this fragment and most who have followed disagree with several of O’Callaghan’s letter reconstructions. At every point in which the enlarged photograph of the fragment at the end of Thiede’s booklet (p. 68) seems to disprove O’Callaghan’s reconstructions, Thiede discounts the empirical evidence which he himself provides and renders his own judgments untouchable by any who have access only to a photograph. In other words, he is saying, “You don’t have a right to criticize O’Callaghan’s reconstruction because you haven’t seen the fragment.” Such a stance is elitist at best; at worst, it moves the entire discussion from a scholarly dialogue to a fideistic statement: Thiede basically says “Trust me.” A constant refrain is that O’Callaghan’s reconstructions are possible. Perhaps this is so, but such are also highly unlikely. In particular, an unbiased reader looking at the photograph will almost certainly disagree with O’Callaghan’s reconstructed nu in line 2¹⁴ and agree with the original editors’ judgment about epsilon, sigma in line 5 (against O’Callaghan’s sigma, alpha). Thiede is quite right that examination of a document firsthand is to be preferred to examination of a photograph.¹⁵ And this is precisely where his and O’Callaghan’s approach falters: others have looked at the MS firsthand and have disagreed with O’Callaghan.

Second, although it is certainly possible that ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν is legitimately omitted in O’Callaghan’s stichometric reconstruction,¹⁶ it strikes me as too convenient for the hypothesis: in order to make this papyrus fragment fit the text of Mark, the non-recoverable portion of the text needs to be altered. This again makes the proposal non-falsifiable. Further—and this still looms as an important consideration—such an omission is unattested in any other MS for this verse.

Third, most damaging for O’Callaghan’s identification is the tau in the place of a delta. Although, admirably, both O’Callaghan and Thiede provide examples of such interchange in koine Greek due to the similar sound of the two letters (e.g., τεfor δεv), none of the examples produced involve the preposition διαv, whether standing alone or in compound. Illustrations such as the interchange of τεfor δέ do not help the case, because both were real words with some semantic overlap. And Thiede’s example of the interchange between δρύφακτονand τρύφακτον (pp. 28-29) is not very convincing, because such a rare word would be expected to have variant spellings. The preposition διά, however, has no semantic overlap with τια (there is, in fact, no such word) and is so common that a schoolboy would have learned its correct spelling. Such a misspelling as O’Callaghan and Thiede envision this scribe as producing would be analogous to a modern author writing “tiameter” for “diameter.” In light of this, surely it is an overstatement for Thiede to assert that “one might go so far as to say that the peculiarities themselves support this view [that 7Q5 = Mark 6:52-53]” (p. 31).

One final point about chapter 3 can be mentioned. In his final footnote of the chapter (n. 31, pp. 40-41), Thiede states that “a more recent computer check [than K. Aland’s], using the most elaborate Greek texts (Ibykus [sic]) has failed to yield any text other than Mark 6:52-53 for the combination of letters identified by O’Callaghan et al. in 7Q5.” In other words, using a very powerful software search engine¹⁷ which is able to scan over 64 million words in hundreds of ancient Greek texts in a matter of minutes, Thiede could not find any text, besides Mark 6, that fit this Cinderella’s shoe.

At first glance, this sounds very impressive. But Thiede overlooked two things. First, the restriction of “letters identified by O’Callaghan” assumes O’Callaghan’s problematic letter reconstructions to be correct. But this manifold assumption is exceedingly gratuitous. It is like observing a sheet of paper that has been left out in the rain. Only a handful of letters can be made out clearly; all else is up for grabs. Now suppose I come along and say that one or two of the clear letters need to be changed. And of the unclear letters, I propose three or four nearly impossible suggestions. I do this because I have a certain text in mind that I want this sheet to be a copy of. Would it be so surprising when my Macintosh spits out that very text—after I have programmed it do so? In doing this kind of thing, Thiede has fallen prey to the very argument he just leveled against Kurt Aland in the same footnote!¹⁸

Second, when one allows for different possibilities than just O’Callaghan’s for the partially legible letters, the Ibycus program¹⁹ does, indeed, seem to permit other texts to be identified with 7Q5. In my own cursory examination of the TLG via Ibycus, I found sixteen texts which could possibly fit (though only if one stretched both his or her imagination and the textual evidence).²⁰

Third, even if none of these is as impressive as is Mark 6:52-53 (a point I would readily concede), there is no necessity in identifying 7Q5 with any known text.²¹ As possible as the O’Callaghan/Thiede proposal is, it remains far more plausible to see 7Q5 as a copy of some unknown text—just like other papyri in cave 7.

Chapter 4 (three pages in length) is an attempt to show, by analogy with two other fragments, that positive identification of 7Q5 can be made in spite of the paucity of letters.

The fifth chapter (“The Seventh Cave at Qumran—Its Text and Their Users”) (pp. 45-63) answers the historical question: Why would Christian documents be concealed in a Qumran cave? Thiede summarizes O’Callaghan’s case that some of the other fragments in this cave are portions from the NT (e.g., 7Q6 = Mark 4:28; 7Q15 = Mark 6:48; 7Q8 = Jas 1:23-24; 7Q9 = Rom 5:11-12; 7Q10 = 2 Pet 1:15; 7Q4 = 1 Tim 3:16-4:3).²² Such equations were pursued by O’Callaghan because he had already felt that his identification of 7Q5 was certain. As would be expected, he has received quite a bit of criticism for these speculations. Some of the arguments against his proposals are that (1) the fragments involved have as few as three or four clearly identified letters; (2) one of the documents, 7Q6, has two fragments, yet O’Callaghan assigned the first to Mark 4, the second to Acts 27; (3) on higher critical grounds, that 2 Peter and 1 Timothy especially could have had copies by 68 CE seemed impossible;²³ (4) four fragments identified as copies of Mark by four different scribes seemed to go beyond even the realm of “Phantasie”;²⁴ (5) textual emendations and/or less than probable reconstructions of letters were forced on the fragments to make them fit the theory; and (6) 7Q4 (= 1 Tim 3:16-4:3) is, paleographically, so much like 7Q5, that it should likewise be dated no later than 50 CE—and this is an impossible date for any pastoral epistle. In my judgment, Thiede does not adequately address these concerns (many of which are completely ignored).

Regarding the historical situation, Thiede devotes ten pages (54-63) to his defense of a Christian cave among the Qumran caves. He builds an ingenious case for geographical contact between Christians and the Essenes in Jerusalem, with many of his points containing an element of truth. From this he extrapolates that when the Christians left Jerusalem for Pella (c. 66 CE), they would have “entrusted them [their sacred documents], or some of them, to their Essene neighbours for safekeeping, and they, in turn, [would have] hid them in a separate cave at Qumran” (p. 58). Although this reconstruction is in the realm of possibility, it is barely so.

Even if we were to grant geographical contact between Christians and Essenes in Jerusalem, it is too much to assume that there was a friendly familiarity between the two communities. Two considerations seem to argue against this. First, the Essenes were the most extreme separatists of any Jewish sect in the first century—so much so that they established a celibate community away from Jerusalem. If they hardly communicated with other Jews, how much less would they do so with Christians? Second, the Essenes were extreme legalists.²⁵ The Christians were at the other end of the spectrum. And it is significant that five of the fragments found in cave 7 are allegedly from Mark and Romans—two books which are about as anti-legalistic as can be found in the NT canon. In light of these two considerations, is it really plausible that the early Christians “entrusted [these documents] to their Essene neighbours for safekeeping”?

The book concludes with several illustrations (including 7Q5, Ì52, et al), inviting the reader to see exactly what it is that the experts have been debating.

Conclusion

To sum up: Not only are O’Callaghan and Thiede arguing that 7Q5 is a fragment from Mark’s Gospel, but they are also appealing to Kurt Aland to list this document officially as a NT papyrus: “Future editions of the Greek New Testament will have to include 7Q5. It should, at long last, receive a ‘p’ number, it must be recognized in the apparatus, with its variants” (p. 41). Here is no detached plea; rather, it is an indictment. And this not-so-subtle indictment takes on parabolic overtones in the concluding statement of the book, where Thiede comments about the alleged early Christians who orchestrated the burying of these documents in Qumran’s Cave 7 (p. 63):

Using papyrus instead of the more expensive parchment, these first Christians were eager to share the first fruits of their own literary harvest with those who were hungry for the good news. When it was a question of promoting the gospel about Jesus they showed a spirit which was at the same time innovative and open-minded. Of them, it could not be said what Mark writes, preserved in 7Q5, about the first disciples after the feeding of the five thousand: ‘Their minds were closed.’

Putting all this in perspective, we conclude this review by addressing two concerns: evidence and attitudes. First, what is the hard evidence on which O’Callaghan’s identification is based? A scrap of papyrus smaller than a man’s thumb with only one unambiguous word—και. Only six other letters are undisputed: τω (line 2), τ (line 3, immediately after the και), νη (line 4), η (line 5). To build a case on such slender evidence would seem almost impossible even if all other conditions were favorable to it. But to identify this as Mark 6:52-53 requires (1) two significant textual emendations (tau for delta in a manner which is unparalleled; and the dropping of ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν even though no other MSS omit this phrase); and (2) unlikely reconstructions of several other letters. Add to this that the MS is from a Qumran cave and that it is to be dated no later than 50 CE and the case against the Marcan proposal seems overwhelming. If it were not for the fact that José O’Callaghan is a reputable papyrologist and that C. P. Thiede is a German scholar, one has to wonder whether this hypothesis would ever have gotten more than an amused glance from the scholarly community.

Second, regarding attitude, I find it disturbing that many conservatives have been so uncritically eager to accept the O’Callaghan hypothesis. 7Q5 does not, as one conservative put it, mean “that seven tons of German scholarship may now be consigned to the flames.”²⁶ On the other hand, I find it equally disturbing that many liberal scholars have uncritically rejected O’Callaghan’s proposal without even examining the evidence. Higher criticism must of course have a say in this discussion; but it must not preclude discussion. Both attitudes, in their most extreme forms, betray an arrogance, an unwillingness to learn, a fear of truth while clinging to tradition, a fortress mentality—none of which is in the spirit of genuine biblical scholarship. When the next sensational archaeological find is made, should not conservatives and liberals alike ask the question: Will we fairly examine the evidence, or will we hold the party line at all costs? ²⁷

¹There is some confusion over the title. The title listed above is what appears on the book’s cover. However, on the title page “Papyrus” has replaced “Fragment.”

²Les ‘Petites Grottes’ de Qumrân, DJD III.

³Its dimensions are, in Thiede’s words, “at the most 3.9 cm high and 2.7 cm wide. At most, visible text covers an area measuring 3.3 cm high and 2.3 cm wide” (p. 25). In other words, 7Q5 is smaller than two standard U.S. postage stamps.

⁴Bib 53 (1972)91-100. Translated into English in the JBL 91 (1972) supplement no. 2.

⁵See Thiede’s bibliography for a listing of the reviews, which are in any case too numerous to mention in a footnote. Among the specific reviews in scholarly journals alone (i.e., neither books nor essays where 7Q5 is only a part of the discussion), New Testament Abstracts lists more than thirty—not to mention one dozen responses by O’Callaghan!

⁶Fifteen years ago, David Estrada and William White, Jr., argued his case in The First New Testament. In 1980, Wilbur Pickering added his support in his The Identity of the New Testament Text , 2nd ed. (Nashville: Nelson), 155-158. This supports his majority text theory of textual criticism in the following way: “That someone should have such a collection of New Testament writings at such an early date may suggest their early recognition as Scripture and even imply an early notion of a New Testament canon” (158).

⁷One should note at the outset that this work is marred by scores of not insignificant typographical errors, including grammar and spelling mistakes, several misquoted statements, and worst of all, a discrepancy in the very title of the book. Such a casual approach to the form of presentation can give the reader a natural temptation to see an equally imprecise handling of the data on Thiede’s part. A second, corrected edition ought to be published as soon as possible, if for no other reason than to remove an unnecessary stumbling block for the viewpoint espoused.

⁸Ì52 is to be dated c. 100-150 CE, while 7Q5 is dated c. 50 BCE-50 CE.

⁹Another possible implication would have to do with the ending of Mark. Since the fragment 7Q5 was written only on one side, it was doubtless a scroll rather than a codex. If so, then the original of Mark would most likely have been a scroll. And if this is the case, it is extremely unlikely that the ending of Mark would have somehow become lost—since the ending of a scroll would, under normal circumstances, be the most protected part of the document. In this case the most plausible scenario for the ending of Mark is that the author chose to end his gospel at 16:8. This argument can certainly be sustained without 7Q5, though it would not hurt to have this MS lend its voice.

¹⁰Thiede makes the repeated assertions that this papyrus should be dated “to the first quarter of the second century (at the very latest)” (p. 2; cf. also p. 21), in spite of the fact that most textual critics today would be more comfortable dating it more generally, c. 100-150 CE (cf. B. M. Metzger, Manuscripts of the Greek Bible: An Introduction to Greek Palaeography [Oxford: Clarendon, 1981] 62). One of the reasons for this is that a scribe’s handwriting is not going to change very much over the duration of his career. Thus, on palaeographical grounds, it is difficult to pinpoint the date of a MS within a period smaller than 50 years (ibid., p. 50).

¹¹Thiede makes the remarkable statement that “leaving theological arguments aside, the earliest possible date for this gospel, historically speaking, is AD 30, the year of the last event recorded in it, the resurrection of Jesus” (p. 25). Thiede’s assessment that higher critical reconstructions—especially as regards the synoptic problem—are merely “theological arguments” strikes me as a bit naïve and ought to signal the reader to Thiede’s antecedent eagerness to accept O’Callaghan’s identification of 7Q5. No reputable NT scholar—regardless of his theological underpinnings or views of gospel priorities—dates Mark this early.

¹²On the basis primarily of these two points Thiede asserts: “Even without considering other aspects of the fragment in detail, it should be clear to any unbiased observer that on the basis of these findings, the indentification [sic] of the fragment as Mk 6:52-53 is more than merely probably [sic]” (p. 27).

¹³See especially O’Callaghan, “El cambio δ>τ en los papiros biblicos,” Bib 54 (1973) 415-16, as a demonstration of this point. O’Callaghan finds twenty places in biblical papyri (18 for LXX, two for NT) where this interchange takes place.

¹⁴See especially G. D. Fee, “Some Dissenting Notes on 7Q5 = Mark 6:52-53,” JBL 92 (1973) 109-12.

¹⁵Actually, the ideal is to examine both the original document and a photograph side-by-side. The advantages of a photograph involve enlargement and contrast especially. I recently discovered this in a fresh examination of Ì26: the photograph revealed at least eight more letters than could be detected by looking at the papyrus alone.

¹⁶With the omission of the expression, the letters per line are as follows: 20/23/20/21/21. If the phrase is left intact, the lines are 20/23/29/21/21.

¹⁷The search engine was in fact Ibycus, but the database being searched was the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, developed by the Packard Humanities Institute. There are now several search engines available to search the TLG, both for Mac and Windows platforms, but there is only one TLG.

¹⁸Thiede points out that “Aland used the computer at his institute in Münster in order to analyse two different combinations of letters which he thought were possible “minimal” readings of the fragment 7Q5 . . . But . . . Aland’s efforts had to fail for a methodological reason . . . : no existing edition of the Greek text of Mark has the variant tau for delta in the ‘diaperasantes’. Thus, Aland’s computer programme of the Greek New Testament, based here on the delta, had to miss Mark 6:52-53 as a possible passage, and it promptly did.”

¹⁹A lexical search engine canvassing over sixty million words in Greek literature (based on the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae), from Homer to 1453 CE.

²⁰The search involved the following pattern: των, καιτ, ννη, corresponding to lines two, three, and four of 7Q5 (and even allowing O’Callaghan his nu in line 2). The passages found include Ezek 23:36; Josephus, Vita 42-3; Vita 236; Bellum 5.528; 7.380-1; Philo Cher. 44; 119; Plant. 135; Plant. 136; Mut. 173; Thucydides, Hist. 1.10.2; 1.60.1; 3.109.2; 4.67.4; 5.82.5; 8.55.1. I would not be so rash as to suggest that 7Q5 is a copy of any of these passages, but just that the identification with Mark 6 is not unparalleled. Almost all of these passages—like Mark 6—involve what I consider to be insuperable problems: date (in the case of the Josephus texts), length of line, and manipulation of partially legible letters. With a little imagination, however, I was able to emend several of the texts (even finding plausible homoioteleuta, metatheses, etc.) and make the data fit. In fact, in one text this was not even necessary. In Philo, Plant. 135 the three lines of text can be reconstructed, without any textual emendation, in a 16/14/16 stichometry:

θωματων απαντων αρ (16)

ιστον  και τελειο  (14)

τατον γεννημα ο εισ (16)

τον πατερα . . .

There is a certain advantage of this text over Mark 6: whereas O’Callaghan’s reconstruction involves twenty or twenty-one letters per line as the norm—including line 3 which has a three-letter gap and ought therefore to have fewer letters, the Philonic text has two letters fewer in line 3, taking into account the gap in 7Q5 at this point.

Of course, there is still the problem of forcing the partially legible letters into the theory—but this suffers no disadvantage over against the Marcan proposal.

²¹Other potential identifications have been suggested on occasion. Cf., e.g., Gordon D. Fee, “Some Dissenting Notes on 7Q5 = Mark 6:52-53,” JBL 92 (1973) 109-112; Conan DiPonio Parson, 7Q5: An Ancient “Honey Do” List? (Snowflake, Saskatchewan: Technasma Press, 1975); Kurt Aland, “Über die Möglichkeit der Identifikation kleiner Fragmente neutestamentlicher Handschriften mit Hilfe des Computers,” in Studies in New Testament Language and Text, ed. J. K. Elliott (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976) 14-38; V. Spottorno, “Una nueva posible identificación de 7Q5,” Sefarad 52 (1992) 541-43.

²²O’Callaghan’s most certain (in his mind, that is) identification was that 7Q4 = 1 Tim 3:16-4:3.

²³This is true even if one holds to apostolic authorship. Some date Paul’s death at 67 CE, and Peter’s at 68.

²⁴So K. Aland, “Neue neutestamentliche Papyri III,” NTS 20 (1974) 363.

²⁵So much so that they even refused to urinate on the Sabbath, regarding even that as “work”! Ironically, in Thiede’s own reconstruction the Essenes’ latrine wall was in close proximity to where the Christians met for prayer. One can only wonder if friendly associations should truly be implied from such evidence.

²⁶Anonymous, “Eyewitness Mark?” Time, 1 May 1972, 54.

²⁷ This essay was originally delivered at the Evangelical Theological Society Southwestern Regional Meeting, held at John Brown University in March, 1994.

Editor's Note:¹

In recent years a small but growing number of New Testament scholars have been promoting what appears to be a return to the Textus Receptus, the Greek text that stands behind the New Testament of the King James Version. But all is not what it appears. In reality, those scholars are advocating “the majority text”—the form of the Greek text found in the majority of extant manuscripts. That the Textus Receptus (TR) resembles the majority text is no accident, since in compiling the TR Erasmus simply used about a half dozen late manuscripts that were available to him. As Hodges points out:

The reason for this resemblance, despite the uncritical way in which the TR was compiled, is easy to explain. It is this: the textual tradition found in Greek manuscripts is for the most part so uniform that to select out of the mass of witnesses almost any manuscript at random is to select a manuscript likely to be very much like most other manuscripts. Thus, when our printed editions were made, the odds favored their early editors coming across manuscripts exhibiting this majority text.²

But the TR is hardly identical with the majority text, for the TR has numerous places where it is supported by few or no Greek manuscripts. Precisely because advocates of the majority text can dissociate themselves from the TR in these places, their argumentation is more sophisticated—and more plausible—than that of TR advocates.

In a previous article³ the present writer interacted with the majority text theory as it has been displayed concretely in The Greek New Testament according to the Majority Text.⁴ For the most part the interaction was with Zane Hodges’s particular defense of the majority text view. Not all majority text advocates share his approach, however. Indeed, several of the critiques made in that article of Hodges’s “stemmatic reconstruction” are voiced by other majority text advocates. The present article, therefore, is a more general critique of the majority text theory and is specifically intended to interact with Wilbur Pickering’s defense of it.

The present author writes from the perspective of “reasoned eclecticism,” the text critical theory that stands behind almost all modern versions of the New Testament (the New King James Version excepted). Three points in the current debate will be discussed: the theological premise of the majority text theory, the external evidence, and the internal evidence.

Preservation and the Majority Text

For many advocates of the majority text view, a peculiar form of the doctrine of the preservation of Scripture undergirds the entire approach. Their premise is that the doctrine of the preservation of Scripture requires that the early manuscripts cannot point to the original text better than the later manuscripts can, because these early manuscripts are in the minority.

Pickering also seems to embrace such a doctrine. For example in 1968 he argued that this doctrine is “most important” and “what one believes does make a difference.”⁵ Further he linked the preservation of Scripture to the majority text in such a way that a denial of one necessarily entails a denial of the other: “The doctrine of Divine Preservation of the New Testament Text depends upon the interpretation of the evidence which recognizes the Traditional Text to be the continuation of the autographa.”⁶ In other words, Pickering seems to be saying, “If we reject the majority text view, we reject the doctrine of preservation.”⁷

This theological premise has far-reaching implications. For one thing Pickering has charged Hort with being prejudiced against the Byzantine texttype from the very beginning of his research: “It appears Hort did not arrive at his theory through unprejudiced intercourse with the facts. Rather, he deliberately set out to construct a theory that would vindicate his preconceived animosity for the Received Text.”⁸ But has not Pickering done the same thing? His particular view of preservation seems to have dictated for him that the majority text must be right. In one place he argues:

Presumably the evidence is the same for both believer and unbeliever, but the interpretation of the facts depends upon the presuppositions used. Let the conservative Christian not be ashamed of his presuppositions—they are more reasonable than those of the unbeliever…. God has preserved the text of the New Testament…the Traditional Text is in the fullest sense of the term, just that.⁹

In other words, according to Pickering, it seems that the Christian’s presupposition is that the majority text is the original text. Apparently to jettison the majority text would be a departure from orthodoxy for many of its advocates. If so, then whatever the merits of this viewpoint are—and there are many—it must be stressed that as long as majority text advocates hold this view of preservation, no amount of evidence will convince them that reasoned eclecticism is right, because the majority text view is “a statement of faith.”¹⁰ And as Pickering has so clearly articulated, this is not just a presupposition—it is a doctrine.¹¹

In many respects this theological premise is commendable. Too many evangelicals have abandoned an aspect of the faith when the going got tough. That the majority text proponents have held tenaciously to this doctrinal position—in spite of an ever-increasing mass of evidence—speaks highly of their piety and conviction. But nowhere do they explain why this view of preservation is the biblical doctrine.¹² At one point, for example, Pickering argues, “I believe passages such as Isa 40:8; Matt 5:18…John 10:35 [etc.]…can reasonably be taken to imply a promise that the Scriptures will be preserved for man’s use (we are to live ‘by every word of God’).”¹³ But he gives no further argument, no exegesis. His one clear statement about preservation is this: “God has preserved the text of the New Testament in a very pure form and it has been readily available to His followers in every age throughout 1900 years.”¹⁴ No proof text is given, just a bare statement.¹⁵

The present writer has several serious problems with this view of the doctrine of preservation, three of which are as follows.¹⁶ First, Scripture does not state how God has preserved the text. It could be in the majority of witnesses, or it could be in a small handful of witnesses. In fact theologically one may wish to argue against the majority: usually it is the remnant, not the majority, that is right.¹⁷

Second, assuming that the majority text is the original, then this pure form of text has become available only since 1982.¹⁸ The Textus Receptus differs from it in almost 2,000 places—and in fact has several readings that have “never been found in any known Greek manuscript,” and scores, perhaps hundreds, of readings that depend on only a handful of very late manuscripts.¹⁹ Many of these passages are theologically significant texts.²⁰ Yet virtually no one had access to any other text from 1516 to 1881, a period of over 350 years. In light of this it is difficult to understand what Pickering means when he says that this pure text “has been readily available to [God’s] followers in every age throughout 1900 years.”²¹ Purity, it seems, has to be a relative term.

Third, again assuming that the majority text is the original and that it has been readily available to Christians for 1,900 years, then it must have been readily available to Christians in Egypt in the first four centuries. But this is demonstrably not true. Literally scores of studies in the last 80 years have demonstrated this point.²² Due to space considerations only one recent doctoral dissertation will be cited. After carefully investigating the Gospel quotations of Didymus, a fourth-century Egyptian writer, Ehrman concludes, “These findings indicate that no ‘proto-Byzantine’ text existed in Alexandria in Didymus’ day or, at least if it did, it made no impact on the mainstream of the textual tradition there.”²³ Pickering speaks of the early Alexandrian witnesses as “polluted” and as coming from a “sewer pipe.”²⁴ Now if these manuscripts are really that defective, and if this is all Egypt had in the first three or four centuries, then this peculiar doctrine of preservation is in serious jeopardy, for those ancient Egyptian Christians had no access to the pure stream of the majority text. If one defines preservation in terms of the majority text, one ends with a view that speaks poorly of God’s sovereign care of the text in ancient Egypt.

In reality, to argue for the purity of the Byzantine stream, as opposed to the pollution introduced by the Alexandrian manuscripts, is to blow out of proportion what the differences between these two texts really are—both in quantity and quality. For over 250 years, New Testament scholars have argued that no textual variant affects any doctrine. Carson has gone so far as to state that “nothing we believe to be doctrinally true, and nothing we are commanded to do, is in any way jeopardized by the variants. This is true for any textual tradition. The interpretation of individual passages may well be called in question; but never is a doctrine affected.”²⁵ The remarkable thing is that this applies both to the standard critical texts of the Greek New Testament and to Hodges’s and Farstad’s Majority Text; doctrine is not affected by the variants between them.²⁶

If the quality of the text (i.e., its doctrinal purity) is not at stake, then what about the quantity? How different is the Majority Text from the United Bible Societies’ Greek New Testament or the Nestle-Aland text? Do they agree only 30 percent of the time? Do they agree perhaps as much as 50 percent of the time? This can be measured, in a general sort of way. There are approximately 300,000 textual variants among New Testament manuscripts. The Majority Text differs from the Textus Receptus in almost 2,000 places. So the agreement is better than 99 percent. But the Majority Text differs from the modern critical text in only about 6,500 places. In other words the two texts agree almost 98 percent of the time.²⁷ Not only that, but the vast majority of these differences are so minor that they neither show up in translation nor affect exegesis. Consequently the majority text and modern critical texts are very much alike, in both quality and quantity.

To sum up: as long as the doctrine of preservation and the majority text view are inseparably linked, it seems that no amount of evidence can overcome the majority text theory.²⁸ But if the doctrine of preservation is not at stake, then evangelical students and pastors are free to examine the evidence without fear of defection from orthodoxy.²⁹

External Evidence

The primary premise in the majority text view is this: “Any reading overwhelmingly attested by the manuscript tradition is more likely to be original than its rival(s).”³⁰ In other words when the majority of manuscripts agree, that is the original.³¹ Majority text advocates have turned this presumption into a statistical probability.³² But in historical investigation, statistical probability is almost always worthless. David Hume, in his Essay on Miracles, argued against miracles on the basis of statistical probability. The majority of people Hume had ever known had never been raised from the dead. In fact none of them had. But belief in the resurrection of Christ is not based on statistical probability—there is evidence which, in this case, overturns statistics.

In historical investigation, presumption is only presumption. An ounce of evidence is worth a pound of presumption. The story has been told that in Aristotle’s day Greek philosophers had developed intricate theories as to what constituted the innards of a frog. In fact there was a great deal of consensus on this—one might even say a “majority view.” But it was all presumption—and it was all overturned as soon as someone cut open a frog and looked at the evidence.

In textual criticism there are three categories of external evidence: the Greek manuscripts, the early translations into other languages, and the quotations of the New Testament found in the church fathers’ writings. If the majority text view is right, then one would expect to find this text form (often known as the Byzantine text) in the earliest Greek manuscripts, in the earliest versions, and in the earliest church fathers. Not only would one expect to find it there, but also one would expect it to be in a majority of manuscripts, versions, and fathers.

But that is not what is found. Among extant Greek manuscripts, what is today the majority text did not become a majority until the ninth century. In fact, as far as the extant witnesses reveal, the majority text did not exist in the first four centuries. Not only this, but for the letters of Paul, not even one majority text manuscript exists from before the ninth century. To embrace the majority text for the Pauline Epistles, then, requires an 800-year leap of faith.

When Westcott and Hort developed their theory of textual criticism, only one papyrus manuscript was known to them. Since that time almost 100 have been discovered. More than fifty of these came from before the middle of the fourth century. Yet not one belongs to the majority text. The Westcott-Hort theory, with its many flaws (which all textual critics today acknowledge), was apparently still right on its basic tenet: the Byzantine texttype—or majority text—did not exist in the first three centuries. The evidence can be visualized as follows, with the width of the horizontal bars indicating the relative number of extant manuscripts from each century.

Many hypotheses can be put forth as to why there are no early Byzantine manuscripts. But once again an ounce of evidence is worth a pound of presumption. In historical investigation one must start with the evidence and then make the hypothesis.

This chart does not tell the whole story. The extant Greek manuscripts—the primary witnesses to the text of the New Testament—do not include the Byzantine text in the first four centuries. But what about the early versions and the church fathers? Do they attest to the Byzantine texttype in the early period?

Many of the versions were translated from Greek at an early date. Most scholars believe that the New Testament was translated into Latin in the second century A.D.³³—two centuries before Jerome produced the Vulgate. Almost one hundred extant Latin manuscripts represent this Old Latin translation—and they all attest to the Western texttype. In other words the Greek manuscripts they translated were not Byzantine. The Coptic version also goes back to an early date, probably the second century³⁴—and it was a translation of Alexandrian manuscripts, not Byzantine ones. The earliest forms of the Syriac are also either Western or Alexandrian.³⁵ What is the oldest version, then, that is based on the majority text? In a carefully documented study, Metzger points out that the Gothic version is “the oldest representative of the…Antiochian [i.e., Byzantine] type of text.”³⁶ When was this version produced? At the end of the fourth century.

The significance of these early versions is twofold:³⁷ (1) None of the versions produced in the first three centuries was based on the Byzantine text. But if the majority text view is right, then each one of these versions was based on polluted Greek manuscripts—a suggestion that does not augur well for God’s providential care of the New Testament text, as that care is understood by the majority text view.³⁸ But if these versions were based on polluted manuscripts, one would expect them to have come from (and be used in) only one isolated region. This is not the case; the Coptic, Ethiopic, Latin, and Syriac versions came from all over the Mediterranean region. In none of these locales was the Byzantine text apparently used. This is strong evidence that the Byzantine text simply did not exist in the first three centuries—anywhere.³⁹ (2) Even if one of these early versions had been based on the majority text, this would only prove that the majority text existed before the fourth century. But it would not prove that it was in the majority before the fourth century.⁴⁰

Early patristic writers are especially valuable in textual criticism because it can be determined when and where they lived. Many of them lived much earlier than the date of any Greek manuscripts now extant for a particular book. Some lived in the first or early second century. If it could be determined what kind of text they used when they quoted from the New Testament, such information would naturally be highly valuable. But textual critics do not usually give much weight to the church fathers. There are several reasons for this, some of which are as follows. First, when a church father quotes from the New Testament, it is not always possible to tell if he is quoting from memory or if he has a manuscript in front of him. Second, he rarely tells which book he is quoting from. He might say, “as it is written,” or “just as Paul says,” or “our Lord said.” Third, none of the original documents of any church fathers remains. Almost all the copies of these early patristic writers come from the Middle Ages. In other words textual criticism must be done on the church fathers in order to see how they attest to the New Testament text.

This last problem is significant because the Byzantine text was the majority text after the ninth century. And virtually all the copies of the fathers come from the ninth century or later. When a scribe was copying the New Testament text quoted by a church father, he would naturally conform that text to the one with which he was familiar.⁴¹ This fact has been recognized for the past 80 years. In 1912, Frederic G. Kenyon, a British textual critic, wrote, “Without any prejudice against the received text [i.e., the Byzantine text], it must be recognized that, where two alternatives are open, the one which diverges from the received text is more likely to be the one originally used by the Father in question.”⁴²

This introduction to patristic use of Scripture is necessary to underscore the following two points. (1) Older studies, which were based on late copies of the church fathers and on uncritical editions, are not helpful in determining what the church fathers said. And it is precisely these older studies that the majority text advocates appeal to.⁴³ (2) So far as this writer is aware, in the last 80 years every critical study has concluded that the majority text was never the text used by the church fathers in the first three centuries. Fee, who is recognized as one of the leading patristic authorities today, wrote:

Over the past eight years I have been collecting the Greek patristic evidence for Luke and John for the International Greek New Testament Project. In all of this material I have found one invariable: a good critical edition of a father’s text, or the discovery of early MSS, always moves the father’s text of the NT away from the TR and closer to the text of our modern critical editions.⁴⁴

In other words when a critical study is made of a church father’s text or when early copies of a church father’s writings are discovered, the majority text is found wanting. The early fathers had a text that keeps looking more like modern critical editions and less like the majority text.⁴⁵

In summing up the evidence from the early church fathers, in none of the critical studies made in the last 80 years was the majority text found to be the text used by the church fathers in the first three centuries.⁴⁶ Though some of these early Fathers had isolated Byzantine readings, the earliest church father to use the Byzantine text was the heretic Asterius, a fourth-century writer.⁴⁷

All the external evidence suggests that there is no proof that the Byzantine text was in existence in the first three centuries. It is not found in the extant Greek manuscripts, nor in the early versions, nor in the early church fathers. And this is a threefold cord not easily broken. To be sure, isolated Byzantine readings have been found, but not the Byzantine texttype. Though some Byzantine readings existed early, the texttype apparently did not.⁴⁸

Another comment is in order regarding external evidence. On several occasions church fathers do more than quote the text. They also discuss textual variants. Holmes points out the value of this for the present discussion.

Final proof that the manuscripts known today do not accurately represent the state of affairs in earlier centuries comes from patristic references to variants once widely known but found today in only a few or even no witnesses. The “longer ending” of Mark, 16:9–20 {Mark 16}, today is found in a large majority of Greek manuscripts; yet according to Jerome, it “is met with in only a few copies of the Gospel—almost all the codices of Greece being without this passage.” Similarly, at Matthew 5:22 he notes that “most of the ancient copies” do not contain the qualification “without cause”…which, however, is found in the great majority today.⁴⁹

Metzger discusses several references in Jerome, Origen, and other early writers where a variant found in the majority of manuscripts in their day is now found in a minority of manuscripts, as well as the other way around.⁵⁰ “In other words, variants once apparently in the minority are today dominant, and vice versa; some once dominant have even disappeared. This fact alone rules out any attempt to settle textual questions by statistical means.”⁵¹

Internal Evidence

Most textual critics are persuaded that the external evidence of the first three centuries is conclusive against the majority text. But it would be a gross misrepresentation of the facts to say that all these witnesses of the early period agree with each other all the time. It is well recognized that the Byzantine manuscripts—from the ninth or tenth century on at least—are far more uniform than the early Alexandrian or Western manuscripts. Several factors account for this, but it is ancillary to the present discussion. The question at the moment is this: When the earliest manuscripts disagree with one another, how should the text critic decide which ones are right?

This is where internal evidence enters the picture. Internal evidence has to do with determining which variant is original on the basis of known scribal habits and the author’s style. The aim is to choose the reading that best explains the rise of the others.

At first this process may sound subjective. Yet people do it every day—every time they read a newspaper. For example if someone were to look at the Win-Loss column for the Los Angeles Lakers and see 38 losses and only 12 wins, he would know that the typesetter switched the numbers. If he saw an article by Harold Hoehner in which A.D. 30 was mentioned as the crucifixion date, the reader could be sure that this was a printing mistake. Not all internal evidence is subjective, then—or else proofreaders would have no jobs.

              The central element in the procedures used by Westcott and Hort …was the internal evidence of documents. Their high appraisal of the [Alexandrian] tradition in preference to “Western” or Byzantine readings rests essentially on internal evidence of readings…it is upon this basis that most contemporary critics, even while rejecting [Westcott and Hort’s] historical reconstructions, continue to follow them in viewing the Majority text as secondary.⁵²

In other words Westcott and Hort—without the knowledge of the early papyri discovered since their time—felt that the majority text was inferior because of internal evidence. (The papyri have simply confirmed their views.) “Majority text advocates, however, object quite strenuously to the use of the canons of internal evidence. These canons, they argue, are only very broad generalizations about scribal tendencies which are sometimes wrong and in any case frequently cancel each other out.”⁵³

There is some truth to this point; in fact even Fee, an ardent opponent of the majority text, has argued likewise. But the fact that internal evidence can be subjective does not mean that it is all equally subjective. “Reasoned eclecticism” maintains today that several canons of internal evidence are “objectively verifiable,”⁵⁴ or virtually so. And where they are, the majority text (as well as the Western text) almost always has an inferior reading, while the Alexandrian manuscripts almost always have a superior reading.⁵⁵

One may consult, for example, Metzger’s A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament to see some of the rationale for accepting one reading over another. Some of the internal criteria are quite subjective—but not all are. One should note especially the places in which Metzger defends the ‘A’ rating of the UBS text.⁵⁶

One other comment is needed here. It seems that the majority text advocates appeal so much to external evidence because they want certainty about the original wording in every place.⁵⁷ But even in the Byzantine text, there are hundreds of splits where no clear majority emerges.⁵⁸ One scholar recently found 52 variants within the majority text in the space of two verses.⁵⁹ In such cases how are majority text advocates to decide what is original? If internal evidence is totally subjective, then in those places the majority text view has no solution, and no certainty. Perhaps this is why Pickering recently said, “Not only are we presently unable to specify the precise wording of the original text, but it will require considerable time and effort before we can be in a position to do so.”⁶⁰

To sum up, though internal evidence is subjective, it is not all equally subjective. And it is precisely where internal evidence is “objectively verifiable” (or virtually so) that most scholars today maintain that the majority text contains a secondary reading. Furthermore in the quest for certainty the majority text theory is in many respects worse off than reasoned eclecticism.⁶¹

Once again the reader should be reminded of a point made earlier. Though textual criticism cannot yet produce certainty about the exact wording of the original, this uncertainty affects only about two percent of the text. And in that two percent support always exists for what the original said—never is one left with mere conjecture. In other words it is not that only 90 percent of the original text exists in the extant Greek manuscripts—rather, 110 percent exists. Textual criticism is not involved in reinventing the original; it is involved in discarding the spurious, in burning the dross to get to the gold.

Conclusion

Is the majority text identical with the original text? The present writer does not think so. There are no doctrinal reasons that compel him to believe that it is, and when all the evidence is weighed—both external and internal—it is quite compelling against such a view. Does this mean that the majority text is worthless? Not at all. For one thing, it agrees with the critical text 98 percent of the time. For another, several isolated Byzantine readings are early, and where they have good internal credentials, reasoned eclectics adopt them as original. But this is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a wholesale adoption of the majority text. And that is precisely the issue taken up in this article.

¹ On February 21, 1990, Wilbur N. Pickering, president of the Majority Text Society, gave a lecture at Dallas Theological Seminary on the majority text and the original text. He took the position that the two were virtually identical. On February 23 the present writer responded. This article is an adaptation of that response.

² Zane C. Hodges, “A Defense of the Majority-Text” (Dallas: Dallas Seminary Book Room, n.d.), p. 1.

³ Daniel B. Wallace, “Some Second Thoughts on the Majority Text,” Bibliotheca Sacra 146 (July–September 1989): 270–90.

⁴ Edited by Zane C. Hodges and Arthur L. Farstad (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1982).

⁵ Wilbur N. Pickering, “An Evaluation of the Contribution of John William Burgon to New Testament Textual Criticism” (ThM thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1968), p. 86.

⁶ Ibid., p. 91.

⁷ More recently, Pickering has linked inspiration and preservation so closely that he argued that a denial of one was the denial of the other: “Are we to say that God was unable to protect the text of Mark or that He just couldn’t be bothered? I see no other alternative—either He didn’t care or He was helpless. And either option is fatal to the claim that Mark’s Gospel is ‘God-breathed’“ (“Mark 16:9–20 and the Doctrine of Inspiration” [unpublished paper distributed to members of the Majority Text Society, September 1988], p. 1).

⁸ Wilbur N. Pickering, The Identity of the New Testament Text, 2d ed. (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1980), p. 32. No one today would deny that this was Hort’s starting point. Indeed, modern textual critics have recognized that Hort depended entirely too much on Aleph and B—so much so that the UBS edition has adopted scores of readings that are attested by the Byzantine texttype (and other witnesses) against these two codices. Precisely because modern textual critics do not share the same rigid presupposition that Hort embraced, they are able to see the value of readings not found in these two uncial texts. In this respect majority text advocates’ presuppositions govern their methods far more drastically than do reasoned eclectics’ presuppositions. In fact majority text advocates often see the issue as so black and white that if even one majority text reading were proved false, their whole theory would collapse. Hort held the opposite (no distinctive Byzantine reading is original), and majority text advocates continue to write in a triumphant manner when they can prove Hort wrong on this point, usually assuming that reasoned eclecticism is thereby falsified.

⁹ Pickering, “An Evaluation of the Contribution of John William Burgon to New Testament Textual Criticism,” p. 90. First italics added; second, Pickering’s.

¹⁰ Pickering, The Identity of the New Testament Text, p. 154.

¹¹ It is noteworthy that Pickering has changed his wording between his master’s thesis and The Identity of the New Testament Text. What is called “the doctrine of Preservation” in his thesis has become, at most, a “presupposition” in Identity. This euphemistic alteration masks what the real issue is: to deny the majority text is to embrace heresy. In one place he even states, “In the author’s opinion, those conservative schools and scholars who have propagated Hort’s theory and text (Nestle is essentially Hortian) bear a heavy responsibility for the growing doubt and disbelief throughout the Church. The ‘neo-evangelical’ defection on Scriptural inerrancy is a case in point” (“An Evaluation of the Contribution of John William Burgon to New Testament Textual Criticism,” p. 90). In this sweeping statement, he has condemned B. B. Warfield and D. A. Carson, the vast bulk of scholars in the Evangelical Theological Society (whose doctrinal statement strongly affirms inerrancy), and almost all the faculty of Dallas Seminary—not to mention the first reader of his own thesis, S. Lewis Johnson, Jr.

¹² In 1980 Pickering argued that “any thoughtful person will realize that it is impossible to work without presuppositions—but a serious effort should be made to let the evidence tell its own story. It is not legitimate to declare a priori what the situation must be, on the basis of one’s presuppositions” (The Identity of the New Testament Text, p. 153). But his thesis, which unashamedly declared this doctrinal position, preceded the book by 12 years.

¹³ Ibid., p. 153 (italics his).

¹⁴ Pickering, “An Evaluation of the Contribution of John William Burgon to New Testament Textual Criticism,” p. 90.

¹⁵ Although Pickering provides no proof text for his view of preservation, he views it as the logical corollary to inspiration: “If the Scriptures have not been preserved then the doctrine of Inspiration is a purely academic matter with no relevance for us today. If we do not have the inspired Words or do not know precisely which they be, then the doctrine of Inspiration is inapplicable” (ibid., p. 88). Elsewhere he argues that uncertainty over the text not only makes inspiration inapplicable, but also untrue (“Mark 16:9–20 and the Doctrine of Inspiration,” p. 1). There are several fallacies in this thinking, both on a historical level and on a logical one. Historically only since 1982 has The Greek New Testament according to the Majority Text (hereafter referred to as the Majority Text) been available. Consequently, assuming that it is an exact reproduction of the autographs, for almost 2,000 years the doctrine of inspiration was inapplicable. Logically three observations may be made: (a) The equation of inspiration with man’s recognition of what is inspired (in all its particulars) virtually puts God at the mercy of man and requires omniscience of man. The burden is so great that a text critical method of merely counting noses seems to be the only way in which man can be “relatively omniscient.” In what other area of Christian teaching is man’s recognition required for a doctrine to be true? (b) The argument that reasoned eclecticism does “not have the inspired Words” implies that textual critics must constantly resort to conjectural emendation—i.e., to reinvent the original from thin air as it were. But this is not a valid charge. Reasoned eclectics simply do not resort to conjectural emendation—there is textual basis for the readings they select. Consequently, it is certain that the original wording is found either in the text or in the apparatus. (c) Even majority text advocates “do not know precisely” which words are original in every place, as Pickering himself admits (The Identity of the New Testament Text, p. 150). Actually this kind of argument is more befitting defenders of the Textus Receptus. Since it backfires for majority text advocates, it has no place in the discussion.

¹⁶ For an excellent critique, see Bart D. Ehrman, “New Testament Textual Criticism: Quest for Methodology” (MDiv thesis, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1981), pp. 140–52. In addition any view of preservation must be the same for both testaments, else one is subject to the charge of Marcionism. But virtually all Old Testament textual critics—even those who embrace inerrancy—recognize the need, albeit rare, for conjectural emendation (and significantly some of the conjectures of an earlier generation have now found support in the earliest witnesses to the Hebrew text found in Qumran). This hardly comports with a “majority text” theory.

¹⁷ Harold W. Hoehner suggested this argument and analogy (personal interview).

¹⁸ Pickering states, “In terms of closeness to the original, the King James Version and the Textus Receptus have been the best available up to now. In 1982 Thomas Nelson Publishers brought out a critical edition of the Traditional Text (Majority, ‘Byzantine’) under the editorship of Zane C. Hodges, Arthur L. Farstad, and others which while not definitive will prove to be very close to the final product, I believe. In it we have an excellent interim Greek Text to use until the full and final story can be told” (The Identity of the New Testament, p. 150).

¹⁹ Bruce M. Metzger, The Text of the New Testament, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 100.

²⁰ E.g., 1 John 5:7–8 and Revelation 22:19.

²¹ Pickering was unaware there would be so many differences between the Textus Receptus and Majority Text when he wrote this note. Originally his estimate was between 500 and 1,000 differences (“An Evaluation of the Contribution of John William Burgon to New Testament Textual Criticism,” p. 120). But in light of the 2,000 differences, “purity” becomes such an elastic term that it is removed from being a doctrinal consideration.

²² Pickering has not evidenced awareness of these. Gordon Fee speaks of Pickering’s “neglect of literally scores of scholarly studies that contravene his assertions,” and states, “The overlooked bibliography here is so large that it can hardly be given in a footnote. For example, I know eleven different studies on Origen alone that contradict all of Pickering’s discussion, and not one of them is even recognized to have existed” (“A Critique of W. N. Pickering’s The Identity of the New Testament Text: A Review Article,” Westminster Theological Journal 41 [1978–79]: 415).

²³ Bart D. Ehrman, Didymus the Blind and the Text of the Gospels (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), p. 260 (italics added). What confirms this further is that in several places Origen, the great Christian textual scholar, speaks of textual variants that were in a majority of manuscripts in his day, yet today are in a minority, and vice versa. Granting every gratuitous concession to majority text advocates, in the least this shows that no majority text was “readily available” to Christians in Egypt.

²⁴ Pickering, “An Evaluation of the Contribution of John William Burgon to New Testament Textual Criticism,” p. 93.

²⁵ D. A. Carson, The King James Version Debate: A Plea for Realism (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979), p. 56. The present writer thinks that Carson has perhaps mildly overstated the case. He would rather state it more cautiously: “No viable variant affects any major doctrine.” But it is readily admitted that he is virtually alone in this; no other textual critic, so far as he knows, couches his terms so tentatively. One other point should be mentioned here: Carson’s statement that Christian doctrines are not jeopardized by textual variants is based on the manuscript evidence, not on the doctrine of preservation. Here is a good instance in which the evidence dictates the shape of the proposition, not vice versa.

²⁶ Sometimes it is alleged that there is no ascension of Christ in the Western texts (e.g., Theo. P. Letis, “In Reply to D. A. Carson’s ‘The King James Version Debate,’“ in The Majority Text: Essays and Reviews in the Continuing Debate, ed. Theo. P. Letis [Fort Wayne, IN: Institute for Biblical Textual Studies, 1987], pp. 199–200). That is not true. Although a portion of the Western text does omit the ascension in Luke 24:51, it retains it in Acts 1:11 (a few Western witnesses omit the second “into heaven” [εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν], but not the third “into heaven”). (These Western witnesses are not followed by the editors of the UBS text.) Further, this doctrine is implicit throughout Hebrews and explicit in 1 Peter 3:21–22. It must be stressed that though occasionally a particular doctrinal proof text is altered or deleted among the manuscripts, never is such a doctrine omitted altogether. Further, the charge cuts both ways. The fact that the Majority Text alters the Comma Johanneum (1 John 5:7–8) (against the Textus Receptus) means that it has deleted the strongest proof text of the Trinity from the New Testament. (Nevertheless the orthodox affirmation of the Trinity in no way depends on the Comma Johanneum.)

²⁷ Actually this number is a bit high, because there can be several variants for one particular textual problem, but only one of these could show up in a rival printed text. Nevertheless the point is not disturbed. If the percentages for the critical text are lowered, those for the Textus Receptus must also be correspondingly lowered.

²⁸ Zane Hodges is much more cautious in how he weds preservation and majority text (but see Ehrman, “New Testament Textual Criticism: Quest for Methodology,” pp. 140–52). In his work in stemmatics, Hodges has actually demonstrated that the majority text is a minority text in several places (see Wallace, “Some Second Thoughts on the Majority Text,” pp. 270–90). Predictably, because preservation is more fundamental to Pickering’s view, he thinks that Hodges is wrong in adopting minority text readings.

²⁹ Ironically Pickering does not realize that he is looking in a mirror when he writes: “Throughout the paper heavy use has been made of the writings of men like Aland, Colwell, and Zuntz who seem to come close to Burgon’s opinion on quite a number of details within the total field. Yet, it is obvious that these men do not buy Burgon’s basic position or method. Why? Possibly they are having difficulty in getting free from the presuppositions instilled in them during their student days. They seem to be reacting to the evidence consistently at different isolated points but seem to be unable to break away from the Hort framework. There may be a subconscious theological necessity not to reconsider the status of the ‘Byzantine’ text” seriously (“An Evaluation of the Contribution of John William Burgon to New Testament Textual Criticism,” p. 110). The charge of “theological necessity” would seem to apply more to Pickering than to the men he cites.

³⁰ The Greek New Testament according to the Majority Text, p. xi. Hodges and Farstad give a second principle: “(2) Final decisions about readings ought to be made on the basis of a reconstruction of their history in the manuscript tradition” (p. xii). Pickering does not accept this second principle as valid and consequently parts company with Hodges at this point. For a critique of the stemmatic reconstruction principle, see Daniel B. Wallace, “Some Second Thoughts on the Majority Text,” pp. 282–85.

³¹ On February 21, 1990, in his lecture at Dallas Seminary, Pickering asserted that his method was much “more complex than merely counting noses.” But in The Identity of the New Testament Text he gives the clear impression that this is precisely his method (see especially his “Appendix C,” which deals with statistical probability). It seems that he has confused method with rationale for the method. The rationale may be somewhat complex, but the method is quite simple: count “noses.”

³² The Identity of the New Testament Text, “Appendix C: The Implications of Statistical Probability for the History of the Text,” pp. 159–69.

³³ See Bruce M. Metzger’s helpful discussion in The Early Versions of the New Testament: Their Origin, Transmission and Limitations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 285–93.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 125–33.

³⁵ Majority text advocates appeal to the Syriac Peshitta as both coming from the second century and being a translation of the Byzantine text. However, although recent scholarship has recognized that the Peshitta must have originated before A.D. 431, it has also concluded that (1) it was not the earliest form of the text in Syriac, probably finding its origins in the fourth to late fourth century; and (2) its textual affinities are not altogether clear (see ibid., pp. 56–63).

³⁶ Ibid., p. 385. He adds, “At the same time not a few Western readings are embedded in this Antiochian base, many of which agree with Old Latin witnesses.”

³⁷ Three other points can be mentioned. First, majority text advocates are fond of saying that since the roots of the majority text are shrouded in mystery, it must not have come from a deliberate recension. They argue this way on the analogy of one version, the Latin Vulgate (for it is known historically that Jerome produced this). But the Vulgate is the exception rather than the rule. Metzger points out, for example: “The exact date of the first Latin version of the Bible, or indeed of any part of the Bible, is uncertain. It is a remarkable fact that the Latin churches do not seem to have retained any memory of this great event in their history. Latin patristic writers report no legend or tradition bearing on the subject” (ibid., p. 286). The unknown roots of a particular tradition, consequently, do not compel one to argue that it goes back to the original.
              Second, the extant versional manuscripts are virtually triple the extant Greek manuscripts in number (i.e., there are about 15,000 versional manuscripts). The vast majority of them (mostly 10,000 Vulgate copies) do not affirm the Byzantine text. If one wishes to speak about the majority, why restrict the discussion only to extant Greek witnesses and not include the versional witnesses?
              Third, regarding Pickering’s appeal to preservation: to argue that the pure text has been readily available to Christians for 1,900 years must refer only to Christians who knew Greek. Yet this was only a small corner of the world after the fourth century. The fact that the Latin Vulgate looks more like the Alexandrian text than the Byzantine text means that Christians in the West never had ready access to the so-called pure text. That the Vulgate is a version is not irrelevant; Pickering’s point about preservation is related to usage, as he shows in his italicized quotation of Matthew 4:4. And if it is related to usage, then it cannot be restricted to Greek.

³⁸ Incidentally, in his discussion of 1 Timothy 3:16 Pickering suggests that the earliest Syriac, Coptic, and Latin versions adopted a reading (“which”) that was based on a corrupt reading (“who”) of the original text (“God”) (“The Majority Text and the Original Text: A Response to Gordon D. Fee,” in The Majority Text: Essays and Reviews in the Continuing Debate, p. 39). Not only does he not explain how a corruption of a corruption could have crept in so quickly, but he apparently does not recognize that to call these versions corrupt at this point is to deny his own view of the doctrine of preservation.

³⁹ The versions also clarify the situation in another way. Metzger refers to “Origen and Jerome, whose sustained critical labors on the text of the Bible are among the most outstanding of any age” (Bruce M. Metzger, “The Practice of Textual Criticism among the Church Fathers,” in New Testament Studies: Philological, Versional, and Patristic [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980], p. 189). Further, Metzger argues, “Among the more scholarly patristic writers Origen and Jerome take first place in the Eastern and the Western Churches respectively” (“St. Jerome’s Explicit References to Variant Readings in Manuscripts of the New Testament,” ibid., p. 199). It is well known that Origen used an Alexandrian text. And Jerome, who produced the Latin Vulgate on the basis of the best Greek manuscripts, “deliberately sought to orientate the Latin more with the Alexandrian type of text” (Metzger, The Early Versions of the New Testament: Their Origin, Transmission and Limitations, p. 359).

⁴⁰ This point is significant because majority text advocates labor strenuously to prove merely the early existence of the Byzantine text, while tacitly assuming that this would also prove numerical superiority in the early centuries.

⁴¹ Though some majority text advocates may wish to deny that scribes did this, such a denial destroys another argument used by majority text advocates. Often they rely on Arthur Vööbus’s work on the text of Rabbula of Edessa to dismantle F. C. Burkitt’s notion that Rabbula was the originator of the Syriac Peshitta. But in doing so, majority text proponents make the evidence say more than it really does. They argue that since Rabbula did not originate the Peshitta (a point Metzger regards as “proved” by Vööbus, and virtually all textual critics now agree), it must go back early, perhaps as early as the second century. (For rebuttal of so early a date, see ibid., pp. 56–63.)
              How does this relate to scribal changes of patristic New Testament quotations? It has to do with Vööbus’s method in proving that the Peshitta does not originate with Rabbula: “In default of the existence of any extensive composition by Rabbula himself, Vööbus analyzed the New Testament quotations in Rabbula’s Syriac translation of Cyril of Alexandria’s Περὶ τῆς ὀρθῆς πίστεως, written shortly after the beginning of the Nestorian controversy in 430. In this translation, instead of rendering Cyril’s quotations from Scripture, Rabbula inserted the wording of the current Syriac version—a method which more than one author followed in translating from Greek into Syriac” (ibid., p. 58). Majority text advocates must recognize this insertion of a version in currency only at a later date, rather than that of the ancient writer. Otherwise one of their strongest pillars (the supposed early date of the Peshitta) falls to the ground. And once they concede this, another pillar (that early fathers must have used the majority text, since later copies of their works did) cannot bear the weight they give it.

⁴² Frederic G. Kenyon, Handbook to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1912), p. 244. Pickering protests to this approach, calling it “‘rigged’ against the TR.” He states, “The generalization is based on the presupposition that the ‘Byzantine’ text is late—but this is the very point to be proved and may not be assumed” (The Identity of the New Testament Text, p. 73). Actually, as Kenyon points out, there is no prejudice against the majority text here. The premise is not that the Byzantine text is late, but that it was in the majority when the church fathers were copied. Surely majority text advocates agree to that. Further, if one assumes careful copying by Byzantine scribes (as majority text advocates do), then an alteration of a church father’s text away from the majority text could not be due to carelessness. Finally, as Fee points out, it is not merely a good, critical copy of a church father’s text that moves it away from the Byzantine texttype; every early copy does the same thing (see note 44). Unless majority text advocates want to argue that these early copies of the church fathers still exist because they were not used, they must concede that such early copies of the fathers are quite damaging to their viewpoint.

⁴³ Remarkably, Pickering has most recently argued on both sides of the issue. In his rebuttal of Kurt Aland’s “The Text of the Church?” (Trinity Journal 8 [1987]: 131–44), where Aland gives substantial evidence that the early fathers did not use the majority text, Pickering says, “Something that Aland does not explain, but that absolutely demands attention, is the extent to which these early Fathers apparently cited neither the Egyptian nor the Majority texts—about half the time. Should this be interpreted as evidence against the authenticity of both the Majority and Egyptian texts? Probably not, and for the following reason: a careful distinction must be made between citation, quotation and transcription…. All Patristic ‘citation’ needs to be evaluated with this distinction in mind and must not be pushed beyond its limits. In any case, Aland’s objectivity is suspect—all his statements of evidence need to be verified by someone with a different bias” (“The Text of the Church” [unpublished paper distributed to members of the Majority Text Society, November 1989], p. 4).
              In other words Pickering appeals to at least a modicum of critical reconstruction of a church father’s words. But then in the following paragraph he argues, “John W. Burgon made copious reference to Patristic citations in all his works; his massive index of 86,489 such citations is still the most extensive in existence (so far as I know)” (ibid.). This comment was in response to Aland’s point that majority text protagonists “completely overlook the quotations from the New Testament found in the writings of the church fathers” (Aland, “The Text of the Church,” p. 139). Pickering is appealing to an uncritical text of the fathers, using late manuscripts, as a basis for the suggestion that the Byzantine texttype is early—and right after he criticized Aland for not making a critical study of the Fathers’ texts.

⁴⁴ Gordon D. Fee, “Modern Textual Criticism and the Revival of the Textus Receptus,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 21 (1978): 26.

⁴⁵ For example, concerning Origen’s commentary on John, Fee says that “in citations where we have the highest level of certainty, Origen’s text is 100 per cent Egyptian” (“Origen’s Text of the New Testament and the Text of Egypt,” New Testament Studies 28 [1982]: 355).

⁴⁶ A few comments should be made here about Aland’s recent study in Trinity Journal, since that study seems to counter this statement (cf. note 43). First, it is not critical, as even Pickering points out (“The Text of the Church,” p. 4).
              Second, even with all the allowances made in the direction of the majority text, i.e., combining percentages of readings which (a) support the majority text against the Alexandrian text and those which (b) support the majority text as well as the Alexandrian text, one finds that:
              Marcion (c. 160?) supported MT 28% of the time (18% against the Alexandrian);
              Irenaeus (d. 202) supported MT 33% (16.5% against Alexandrian);
              Clement of Alexandria (d. 215) supported MT 44% (15% against Alexandrian);
              Origen (d. 254) supported MT 45% (17% against Alexandrian);
              Hippolytus (d. 235) supported MT 50% (19% against Alexandrian);
              Methodius (280?) supported MT 50% (19% against Alexandrian);
              Adamantius (d. 300) supported MT 52% (31% against Alexandrian);
              Asterius (d. 341) supported MT 90% (50% against Alexandrian);
              Basil (d. 379) supported MT 79% (40% against Alexandrian);
              Apostolic Constitutions (380?) supported MT 74% (41% against Alexandrian);
              Epiphanius (d. 403) supported MT 74% (41% against Alexandrian);
              Chrysostom (d. 407) supported MT 88.5% (40.5% against Alexandrian); etc.
Whether these writers used the Egyptian text is not the issue here; indeed, perhaps Aland makes too much of this (and Pickering ably points this out). But to suppose that they used the Byzantine text as their primary texttype is demonstrably not true before A.D. 341. (Compare Asterius, above, with his predecessors.)
              Third, Pickering argues that “any claim that Aland makes for the Egyptian text, on the basis of these Fathers, is a claim that can be made even more strongly for the Majority text” (p. 3). But this would only be true if the Fathers’ support of the majority text readings were support of distinctive majority text readings. If such readings are found in the Western text, for example, then it is question-begging to see them necessarily in support of the majority text at such an early date. In this connection it is significant that Hort argued that no distinctive Byzantine reading had been found in the Fathers in the first three centuries, a point that Fee echoed.

⁴⁷ It is remarkable that majority text advocates acknowledge that Chrysostom did not use a full-blown Byzantine text—and even that Photius, a ninth-century writer, was apparently unaware of it. They use this argument against the idea of finding the roots of the Byzantine text in a particular official recension. Whatever are the merits of that argument, they should recognize that if Photius did not use the text in the ninth century, then it may not have been readily accessible even then. There is in fact some evidence that suggests that it was not until the ninth or tenth century that the Byzantine manuscripts really had high agreement with the Majority Text. More than one study has shown that the Byzantine text became more uniform and more like the Majority Text as time went on.

⁴⁸ When it comes to Byzantine readings in the Fathers or in some of the papyri, the evidence will not bear the inference that the Byzantine texttype existed before the fourth century. Majority text advocates seem to confuse “reading” with “text.” Only by doing this can they make the claim that the majority text existed in the first three centuries. This can be seen by way of analogy. The King James Version is a “text,” as is the New American Standard Bible. But “In the beginning was the Word” is a “reading.” The fact that it is found in John 1:1 in both the KJV and the NASB does not imply that the NASB in toto existed in 1611. (In fact hundreds of phrases and even whole verses in the NASB are found in the KJV. All of these are isolated “readings.” Even with all these isolated readings that existed in 1611, it is not true that the NASB existed in 1611.) Yet this is the kind of inference that majority text advocates try to make out of isolated Byzantine readings that existed before the fourth century, almost all of which are found in other, demonstrably early texttypes.

⁴⁹ Michael W. Holmes, “The ‘Majority Text Debate’: New Form of an Old Issue,” Themelios 8:2 (1983): 17.

⁵⁰ Bruce M. Metzger, “Patristic Evidence and the Textual Criticism of the New Testament,” New Testament Studies 18 (1972): 379–400; idem, “Explicit References in the Works of Origen to Variant Readings in New Testament Manuscripts,” in Historical and Literary Studies, Pagan, Jewish, and Christian (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), pp. 88–103; idem, “St. Jerome’s Explicit References to Variant Readings in Manuscripts of the New Testament,” in New Testament Studies: Philological, Versional, and Patristic, pp. 199–210.

⁵¹ Holmes, “The ‘Majority Text Debate’: New Form of an Old Issue,” p. 17.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid. See, for example, Pickering: “The basic deficiency, both fundamental and serious, of any characterization based upon subjective criteria is that the result is only opinion; it is not objectively verifiable” (The Identity of the New Testament Text, p. 93).

⁵⁴ See Holmes, “The ‘Majority Text Debate’: New Form of an Old Issue,” p. 17.

⁵⁵ But this is not always true. In scores of places the editors of the modern critical texts have adopted a Byzantine reading against an Aleph-B alignment (contra Hort). This illustrates two things: (1) not only are internal criteria at times very objective—for the external evidence in such cases is often very much against the Byzantine reading—but it demonstrates the falsity of Pickering’s charge that modern textual critics “manipulate the text to [their] own subjective bias” (The Identity of the New Testament Text, p. 93); and (2) although the Byzantine text is not early, many Byzantine readings are—and these have the right to be heard when internal evidence is considered. As this writer has argued elsewhere, on the basis of internal criteria a number of Byzantine readings that have not found their way into the text of modern critical texts need to be given a hearing (cf. “Some Second Thoughts on the Majority Text,” and “A Textual Variant in 1 Thessalonians 1:10: ᾿Εκ τῆς ᾿Οργῆς vs. ᾿Απὸ τῆς ᾿Οργῆς,” Bibliotheca Sacra 588 [October–December 1990]: 470–79). It should be kept in mind that these Byzantine readings are almost never distinctive Byzantine readings.

⁵⁶ That there are not many ‘A’ ratings (virtual certainty about the original) in the UBS text does not indicate overall uncertainty of reasoned eclectics about the text of the New Testament. Only 1,440 textual problems are listed, though there are over 300,000 textual variants among the manuscripts. The vast majority are not listed because the editors are quite certain about the true reading and/or such variants do not affect translation. Hence Pickering overstates his case when he points out that since there are five hundred changes between UBS2 and UBS3 even though the same committee of five editors prepared both, “it follows that so long as the textual materials are handled in this way we will never be sure about the precise wording of the Greek text” (The Identity of the New Testament Text, p. 18). Furthermore the charge could be reversed: Pickering and Hodges apparently disagree over 150 times on the wording of the text of Revelation (let alone the rest of the New Testament), for Hodges’s stemmatics led him to adopt a minority text more than 150 times for the Apocalypse.

⁵⁷ It is certainly more objectively verifiable to count manuscripts than to deal with variants case by case. See, in particular, Pickering, “An Evaluation of the Contribution of John William Burgon to New Testament Textual Criticism,” pp. 86–91. In particular this comment should be noted: “A pronounced feature of the field of New Testament textual criticism today is the prevailing confusion and uncertainty…. It is high time that conservatives recognize both this fact and its implications” (ibid., p. 89). Furthermore this desire for (or insistence on) certainty is part and parcel of the inseparable link of inspiration to preservation that Pickering especially appeals to.

⁵⁸ It would not do justice to say that none of these splits is significant (e.g., ἔχομεν/ἔχωμεν in Rom 5:1).

⁵⁹ Aland, “The Text of the Church?” pp. 136–37, commenting on 2 Corinthians 1:6–7a. To be fair, Aland does not state whether there is no clear majority 52 times or whether the Byzantine manuscripts have a few defectors 52 times. Nevertheless his point is that an assumption as to what really constitutes a majority is based on faulty and partial evidence (e.g., von Soden’s apparatus), not on an actual examination of the majority of manuscripts. Until that is done, it is impossible to speak definitively about what the majority of manuscripts actually read.

⁶⁰ The Identity of the New Testament Text, p. 150.

⁶¹ This quest for certainty often replaces a quest for truth. There is a subtle distinction between the two. Truth is objective reality; certainty is the level of subjective apprehension of something perceived to be true. But in the recognition that truth is objective reality, it is easy to confuse the fact of this reality with how one knows what it is. Frequently the most black-and-white, dogmatic method of arriving at truth is perceived to be truth itself. Too often people with deep religious convictions are certain about an untruth. For example cultists often hold to their positions quite dogmatically and with a fideistic fervor that shames evangelicals; first-year Greek students want to speak of the aorist tense as meaning “once-and-for-all” action; and almost everyone wants simple answers to the complex questions of life.

Introduction¹

In a recent letter, a visitor to the Biblical Studies Foundation web site asked, “Could you help explain whether the Bible promotes drinking alcohol or whether it condemns it.”

This is obviously a concern to many Christians—and for good reason! With the rampant abuse of alcohol in this country, resulting in shattered lives and tens of thousands of deaths each year, any person with a conscience should be deeply concerned about this issue. However, caution is also needed in a different direction: too often Christians have moral outrage because of abuses of one of God’s gifts—outrage that leads to a condemnation of those who are not abusers. Things that once were issues are often now regarded as normal activities. For example, when my grandmother and grandfather were dating, her parents were concerned about this young man because he liked to go to football games. That was taboo for them. Some Christians have condemned others for wearing make-up, going to the opera, or even sending Christmas cards. Christians, it seems, have an incredible ability to invent rules and regulations. It’s endemic to human nature—but it’s also a modern, unvarnished form of Pharisaism.

Our attitude toward alcohol may well be conditioned by our culture more than we realize. Since the days of Prohibition, many believers have simply assumed that partaking of alcoholic beverages was sinful. What is interesting is that in many other countries God-fearing Christians see no problem with alcoholic beverages. (When I was on sabbatical in England, for example, I heard the pastor at an evangelical church use an illustration which involved alcohol in a positive light. He was speaking about our attitude toward little disasters—such as when one brings home the groceries and the one sack that had the Sherry in it falls to the ground and the Sherry bottle breaks! The very casualness of this illustration put in bold relief the difference in attitude between many American Christians and many European Christians regarding alcoholic beverages. If a pastor in the States were to use the same illustration, most churches would censure him for it if not outright sack him.)

One question we must wrestle with is this: If there is a subcultural Christian prohibition that goes beyond scripture, are we obligated to follow it? Should we even endorse it? Ignore it? Fight against it? As we all know, there are numerous Christian taboos that go beyond scripture, depending on when and where one lives. Perhaps this one can be seen as paradigmatic for how to treat the others.

At all points, we must seek to be biblical. This requires resisting the temptation to go beyond what the Bible restricts. As I began to look into this topic, I was actually quite amazed at the biblical writers’ attitude toward alcohol. I had expected it to be far more negative than it really was. One lesson I have learned from this is that although I think that I am being biblical, often my tradition and Christian subculture shape my thinking more than I realize.

Preliminary Framework: Grey Areas

A word should be said about grey areas to begin with. Some Christians view grey areas as those moral zones in which one believer has the right to brow-beat another. Thus, if one believer thinks it is wrong for another to go to football games, the first believer has the right to exercise judgment on the second. This ‘sin-sniffing’ delves into all areas, and the things that get lumped into this cauldron of evil deeds are quite numerous: attending the opera, playing cards, atttending any kind of motion pictures, owning a television, listening to rock or country-western or even Mozart, investing in the stock market, observing Christmas with a decorated tree, reading mystery novels, spouses having separate checking accounts, women wearing make-up or slacks, etc. What all these areas have in common is that they are not discussed in scripture. Thus, if one wants to label them as evil, he either has to do some rather ingenious interpretation of the Bible or else simply appeal to one’s conscience as the standard by which others are to be measured.

We all can see the ludicrousness of such a stance when it comes to grey zones that are inoffensive to me. But when there is something that I have found offensive, the natural tendency is for me to make sure everyone else around me abides by the same rules.

One of the hallmarks of modern American Christianity is its preoccupation with a  ‘formula faith.’ Tremendously popular are conferences that address conflicts between parents and youth and how to resolve them. One well-known such conference turns (occasionally) good advice into hundreds of rules that can suffocate one’s walk with God.  We are enamored of the ‘How to’ books that work for others and perhaps may work for us. All too often, once a person has found a tailor-made Bible-reading schedule, or a tailor-made pattern of prayer or diet or method of raising children or love-making technique, he writes a book about it and proclaims its universal applicability and even its normativeness. The reason such sells? Because legalism is endemic to human nature. We can package such as ‘practical Christianity’ or ‘a wise and godly lifestyle’ or ‘principles to live by,’ but at bottom when such advice goes beyond the scriptures and turns into more than advice, it is legalism. Such a preoccupation with legalism is seen in church membership requirements, missionary and pastoral ordination bodies, and Bible college/seminary codes of conduct. Take a look at a catalog of almost any evangelical institute of higher learning. You will notice that all too often the code of conduct section will spend an inordinate amount of space making grey areas taboo while spending almost no space articulating what the Bible declares to be sinful behavior.

Church historian M. James Sawyer recently spoke at the western regional meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society on Sola Scriptura in the Protestant tradition. In his lecture he noted the irony of the modern milieu:

Among contemporary denominations we find statements such as that of the [denomination’s name withheld], who in their licensing and ordination questionnaire asks candidates if they agree that the Bible is the ‘only and infallible rule of faith and practice’ for the believer.  (The questionnaire on the very next line asks the candidate if he agrees to abstain from the use of alcohol in all forms.) 

The point we are trying to make here is twofold: (1) Christians tend to compile rules and regulations that go beyond what is written; and (2) when such grey zones are considered evil, those who do not abide by such rules are often viewed as ‘the weaker brother.’ In reality, the weaker brother in scripture is the one who has too many scruples, not too few (cf. Romans 14)! It is a tragic irony that as one matures in the faith, all too often his life collects more and more oppressive chains of legalism. As much as there may well be good reasons for one to personally hold to certain convictions,²  we must be very careful about extending such beyond ourselves.³

The Biblical Data:
Wine and other Alcoholic Beverages in the Bible

The following are some roughly random notes on wine and other alcoholic beverages in the Bible. Even a casual look at the scriptures reveals a much different perspective than what most modern American Christians have about this topic.

In general, we can say that the Bible neither condemns drinking per se nor promotes it. Drinking alcoholic beverages is one of those grey areas that is a matter of one’s personal conscience. But there is more in scripture than just this individualistic approach.

Isn’t it Really Grape Juice?

Some take the words for wine to mean ‘grape juice.’ If this were so, then why would there be prohibitions against drunkenness? One cannot get drunk on grape juice. Further, Jesus’ first miracle was changing the water into wine at the wedding of Cana in Galilee. He made between 120 and 180 gallons of wine! Even if this had been grape juice, it would soon turn to wine because the fermentation process would immediately begin. But it most certainly was not grape juice: the head waiter in John 2:10 said, “Every man sets out the good wine first, then after the guests have drunk freely, the poor wine. But you have kept the good wine until now.” The verb translated ‘drunk freely’ is almost always used of getting drunk (and is so translated in the NRSV here). In the least, the people at this wedding feast, if not drunk, would certainly be drinking alcohol fairly freely (if not, this verb means something here that is nowhere else attested⁴). And this makes perfect sense in the context: The reason why a man brings out the poorer wine later is because the good wine has numbed the senses a bit. Grape juice would hardly mask anything. Note also Acts 2:13—”they are full of sweet wine”—an inaccurate comment made about the apostles when they began speaking in tongues, as though this explained their unusual behavior. The point is: If they were full of grape juice would this comment even have made any sense at all? That would be like saying, “Well, they’re all acting strange and silly because they have had too much orange juice this morning!”

There are other references to alcoholic beverages in the Bible: Several times in the first books of the Bible, wine and strong drink are prohibited to those who take a Nazarite vow (cf. Num 6, Judges 13). Even grape juice and fresh and dried grapes (i.e., raisins, as the NIV renders the word) are prohibited to the Nazarite (Numbers 6:3)!⁵  But that restriction is only for those who make this vow. If someone today wants to claim that believers do not have the right to drink alcohol on the analogy of a Nazarite vow (as some today are fond of doing), they also should say that believers ought not to eat Raisin Bran!

Negative Statements about Wine Indicate that it is not Grape Juice

Further, the Bible at times speaks very harshly about becoming enslaved to drink or allowing it to control a person, especially to the point of drunkenness. Proverbs 20:1—“Wine is a mocker, strong drink a brawler, And whoever is intoxicated by it is not wise” (NASB). Cf. also Prov 21:17 (where heavy drinking and gluttony are equally condemned); 1 Sam 1:14; Isa 5:11, 22; 28:1 (drunkenness is condemned); 28:7; 29:9; 56:12; Jer 23:9; 51:7; Joel 3:3. In the New Testament notice: Eph 5:18 (“do not get drunk with wine”); 1 Tim 3:3, 8; Titus 1:7 ([elders and deacons ought not be] “addicted to wine or strong drink”); Titus 2:3 (older women, who would serve as role models to the younger ones, must not be addicted to wine). As well, numerous passages use wine or drunkenness in an analogy about God’s wrath, immorality, etc. (cf. Rev. 14:8, 10; 16:19; 17:2; 18:3).

The significance of these negative statements is just this: If this were only grape juice, why would excess in drinking it be condemned? If this were only grape juice, why are certain mental effects attributed to it (cf., e.g., Psalm 60:3)? One can’t have it both ways. You can’t say that wine is always grape juice, for then the negative statements in scripture make no sense; those who say that it is only grape juice tend to focus just on the neutral and positive passages, conveniently allowing them to condemn the drinking of real wine at all times. But even this position is not logical: If the Bible only speaks of grape juice, then it makes no comment about alcoholic wine. And if so, then it does not directly prohibit it. And if we are going to prohibit something that the Bible does not address, why stop at wine? Why don’t we include the ballet, opera, football games, country-western music (actually, I might be in favor of banning this one!), salt water fishing, zippers on clothes, etc. Once legalism infests the soul it doesn’t know where to quit.

In sum, is wine the same as grape juice? No, for if it were, the Bible would hardly condemn the abuse of such. Those who argue that the two are identical simply cannot handle the passages that speak about excess.

Neutral and Positive References to Alcoholic Beverages in the Bible

At the same time, there are several neutral, almost casual references to alcoholic beverages. Genesis 14:18 refers to Melchizedek, a type of Christ, as offering wine to Abram; Nehemiah 2:1 refers to the king drinking wine (Nehemiah was required to taste it first to make sure it was not poisoned); Esther 5:6; 7:1-2 speaks of wine that Esther (the godly Jewess) drank with the king; Job 1:13 refers to righteous Job’s family drinking wine; Daniel 10:3 speaks of drinking wine as a blessing after a time of fasting. Some of Jesus’ parables are about wine, wineskins, vineyards (cf. Matt 9:17; 21:33; even John 15 speaks of God the Father as the vinedresser!). Paul tells Timothy to drink some wine for his stomach’s sake and not just water (1 Tim 5:23). The same Greek and Hebrew terms that were used to speak of the abuses of wine are used in these passages. One cannot argue, therefore, that alcoholic beverages are in themselves proscribed, while grape juice is permitted. The lexical data cannot be so twisted.

There are, as well, positive statements about alcoholic beverages: Deut 14:26 implies that it is a good thing to drink wine and strong drink to the Lord: “And you may spend the money for whatever your heart desires, for oxen, or sheep, or wine, or strong drink, or whatever your heart desires; and there you shall eat in the presence of the LORD your God and rejoice, you and your household” (NASB). Psalm 4:7 compares joy in the Lord to the abundance of wine; Psalm 104:14-15 credits God as the creator of wine that “makes a man’s heart glad” (cf. also Hos 2:8); honoring the Lord with one’s wealth is rewarded with the blessings of abundant stores of wine (Prov 3:10);  love is compared to wine repeatedly in the Song of Songs, as though good wine were similarly sweet (1:2, 4; 4:10; 7:9). The Lord prepares a banquet with “well-aged wines... and fine, well-aged wines” for his people (Isa 25:6) [obviously this cannot be grape juice, for aging does nothing but ferment it!].

The lack of wine is viewed as a judgment from God (Jer 48:33; Lam 2:12; Hos 2:9; Joel 1:10; Hag 2:16); and, conversely, its provision is viewed as a blessing from the Lord (cf. Gen 27:28; Deut 7:13; 11:14; Joel 2:19, 24; 3:18; Amos 9:13-14). Cf. also Isa 55:1; Jer 31:12; Zech 9:17.

Indeed, there was even the Passover tradition that went beyond the biblical teaching: by the time of the first century, every adult was obliged to have four glasses of wine during the Passover celebration. Jesus and his disciples did this in the Last Supper.⁶ The fact that the wine of the Passover was a symbol the Lord used for his blood and for the new covenant implicitly shows that our Lord’s view of wine was quite different from that of many modern Christians.

What is truly remarkable here are the many positive statements made about wine and alcoholic beverages in the Bible.⁷ Wine is so often connected with the blessings of God that we are hard-pressed to figure out why so many modern Christians view drink as the worst of all evils. Why, if one didn’t know better, he might think that God actually wanted us to enjoy life! Unfortunately, the only Bible most of our pagan friends will read is the one written on our lives and spoken from our lips. The Bible they know is a book of ‘Thou shalt nots,’ and the God they know is a cosmic killjoy.

I think the best balance on this issue can be see in Luke 7:33-34: John the Baptist abstained from drinking wine; Jesus did not abstain [indeed, people called him a drunkard! Although certainly not true, it would be difficult for this charge to have been made had Jesus only drunk grape juice]. Both respected one another and both recognized that their individual lifestyles were not universal principles. One man may choose not to drink; another may choose to drink. We ought not condemn another servant of the Lord for his choice.

As well, Romans 14 is a key passage for gleaning principles about how we ought to conduct ourselves in relation to one another on this issue: weaker brothers ought not to judge those whose freedom in Christ allows them to enjoy alcoholic beverages; stronger brothers ought not to disdain weaker brothers for their stance. Whether we drink or not, let us do all things to the glory of God.

Conclusion

There is much more that could be said about this issue; no doubt many readers will respond critically for what was left out. In later essays I hope to address some questions that arise because of this piece.

This brief essay really has no conclusion; rather, this is the first volley in an ongoing discussion. The general contours of biblical teaching are that wine is a blessing from the Lord, something to be enjoyed. But like any good gift from God, it can be abused: in this case, abuse involves addiction and drunkenness. But whenever we condemn others who are able to enjoy God’s good gifts in moderation as though they were abusers, we misrepresent biblical Christianity. At bottom, it seems that biblical Christianity has a much different face than what much of modern Christianity wears. In many respects, we resemble more the ancient Pharisees than the Lord’s disciples.

¹ The reader may wish to consult my essay, “1 Thessalonians 5:22—The Sin-Sniffer’s Catch-All Verse: ‘Avoid Every Appearance of Evil’” to get a broader based treatment on the issue of grey areas in the Christian life.

²For example, we all know of some folks whose family history involves alcoholism. Many of these folks rightfully abstain for fear of their own tendencies to abuse alcohol. I have a friend who used to be an alcoholic and now cannot even gargle (since mouthwash usually has a large amount of alcohol) or else he could go into a drinking binge. He recognizes that his own convictions about alcohol are not universally applicable; his friends are sensitive enough not to drink in his presence.

³My views comport with my understanding of what it means to be a New Covenant Christian. Since we have been given the Spirit, we are no longer under the Old Testament law, but now must live by the law of Christ. The Spirit himself guides each one of us. There are, to be sure, several laws that must be obeyed (the New Testament has over two hundred); but as a New Covenant Christian I recognize both that the overriding principle of these commandments is love and that the undergirding power is provided by the Spirit of God.

⁴In the least, the verb μεθύσκω, when used of drinking, always means at least ‘freely drinking of alcoholic beverages’ (once in the LXX it is used metaphorically of being filled with grain [Hosea 14:8], though even here the imagery might involve a metonymy of cause for effect [if so, grain would mean fermented grain]). LSJ give as the first definition of this verb the causative notion of make drunk, intoxicate; for the passive form of the verb the lexicon gives drink freely, get drunk. BAGD gives the following definition: “cause to become intoxicated; in our lit. only pass. … get drunk, become intoxicated… drink freely, become drunk.”  The semantic domain lexicon by Louw and Nida (23.37) offers this definition (though they incorrectly parse the verb as coming from μεθύω): “to drink freely, to drink a great deal, to get drunk.” (LN’s definition for the verb μεθύσκω [88.285] is “to become intoxicated, to get drunk”; 1 Thess 5:7 uses both verbs interchangeably: “those who get drunk get drunk at night.”)

⁵The very fact that the Hebrew text makes a distinction between wine and grape juice implies that when ‘wine’ is spoken of the fermented drink is in view.

⁶ Technically, Jesus and the disciples had only three ritual cups of wine. The fourth cup, which represented the kingdom, was not drunk. Thus, when Jesus prayed in the garden, “If it is your will, take this cup from me” he was referring to the symbolism of the third cup--the cup of redemption by judgment. However, even though they had only three ritual cups, they may well have had more non-ritual wine, for this was allowed.

⁷‘Wine’ occurs 236 times in the NASB, 214 times in the NIV, 230 times in the NRSV, and 210 times in the REB. Now, to be sure, not all of these are in positive statements, but neither are the majority in negatives statements. The most common Hebrew word is יינ (134 times in the MT), while the Greek word  οἶνος occurs in the New Testament 26 times.